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Abstract
Election interference has long been a tool of foreign policy available to state actors
but has recently risen in prominence as a result of Russia’s efforts to influence the 2016
presidential election in the United States. Although much has been written about election
interference, most existing scholarship focuses on its use to promote a certain candidate or
party. Hybrid warfare theory, which posits that modern conflict is increasingly characterized
by the coordinated use of a wide range of tactics, provides a powerful alternative framework
for understanding election interference. This Independent Study considers election
interference through the lens of hybrid warfare theory, conceptualizing it as a tactic of hybrid
warfare that can be used to intensify internal divisions within a target state. Using the
comparative case study methodology, this study seeks to investigate how foreign election
interference affects internal divisions, and how changes in these divisions impact a state’s
foreign policy. Three cases in which interference is widely thought to have occurred are
examined: the 2016 American presidential election, the 2018 Taiwanese local elections, and
the 2016 “Brexit” referendum. Analysis of these cases reveals that election interference
caused an intensification of internal divisions in all three countries where it occurred.
However, the intensification of these divisions did not appear to undermine the ability of
these states to implement foreign policy. These results suggest that hybrid warfare theory
provides a useful way to understand election interference and demonstrate the need for
additional research in this area.
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Introduction

The events of the American presidential election of 2016 catapulted the topic of
election interference to the forefront of public discourse in the United States. The realization
that foreign adversaries had undermined the integrity of the presidential race, and could do so
again, has brought new urgency to the task of understanding how election interference affects
democratic societies. Of course, election interference is not a new phenomenon. The United
States, the Soviet Union, and other great powers have engaged in countless instances of
election interference in foreign countries, and research suggests that a majority of elections
carried out since World War II were impacted by some kind of foreign intervention (Bubeck
and Marinov 1989, 111). However, the recent prominence of election interference has made it
more important than ever to understand its impact on democratic states.
This Independent Study argues that election interference is often a key tactic of
hybrid warfare campaigns. Such interference seeks primarily to exacerbate internal divisions
within the country that it targets through tactics such as the dissemination of disinformation
and cyberattacks against key institutions and political actors. Thus, I hypothesize that
election interference campaigns will intensify the internal divisions of the target state. I
expect this to have a detrimental effect on the state’s ability to conduct foreign policy. A more
divided political establishment should have a harder time agreeing on priorities,
implementing policy, and responding to challenges from foreign actors. As a result, I
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hypothesize that targets of election interference will be more likely to make significant
foreign policy concessions to their adversaries.
This Independent Study will draw on studies of election interference in the United
States and other countries, but will be primarily grounded in hybrid warfare theory.
Specifically, I conceptualize election interference as a tactic of hybrid warfare. Although
definitions of hybrid warfare vary, I consider it to be the coordinated use of conventional and
unconventional instruments of foreign policy, including military or proxy forces, information
warfare, and covert operations, to destabilize an adversary (Grigalashvili 2020). Most
importantly, hybrid warfare thrives on ambiguity, eschewing overt military confrontation in
favor of operating in a “grey area” between war and peace (Grigalashvili 2020, 101). This
characteristic can make it difficult for target states to determine if a hybrid war is even taking
place, which complicates the formulation of an effective response. Due to its high degree of
deniability, low cost, and relative effectiveness, election interference fits perfectly into the
paradigm of hybrid warfare.
Like many instruments of hybrid warfare, election interference is most effective when
it can take advantage of existing societal divisions. Scholarship by Darin Johnson and others
insightfully points out that racial tension and other internal divisions in American society
were exploited by Russian intelligence services to support the Trump campaign and spread
discontent (Johnson 2019, 196). Johnson argues that Russia sought to destabilize and
delegitimize the American political process above all else, with the promotion of a specific
candidate being relegated to a secondary objective (Johnson 2019, 202). This conception of
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Russian goals in 2016 is consistent with the idea that Russia was engaging in hybrid warfare
against the United States.
This Independent Study will employ the comparative case study methodology. This is
the best approach because the variables in this study can only be coded through careful and
intensive investigation of each case of election interference. The need for rigorous
investigation of a small number of cases is also increased because acts of election
interference may not be discernible at first glance due to their covert nature. This study will
therefore focus on three cases: the 2016 American Presidential election, the 2016 Brexit
Referendum, and the 2018 local elections in Taiwan. The independent variable will be the
intensity of election interference and the dependent variable will be the degree to which
concessions are offered to foreign adversaries. The degree to which internal divisions are
intensified will be the intervening variable. I will create indices for each of these variables
and observe how they evolve throughout an election cycle in order to test my hypotheses.
In conclusion, this Independent Study should help elucidate the impact of election
interference campaigns on democratic societies. It will test the hypotheses that election
interference exacerbates internal divisions within its targets and that victims of election
interference will offer foreign policy concessions to adversaries as a result of these divisions.
Careful analysis of several recent cases of election interference should provide a good initial
test of these hypotheses and possibly shed light on other mechanisms by which election
interference affects democratic societies. In any event, this research should help us better
understand election interference and work towards methods of defending against it.
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Chapter 1
Theory and Literature Review

This chapter surveys literature on hybrid warfare theory before moving on to a
discussion of election interference. Although the concept of hybrid warfare was originally
developed in the early 2000s, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 propelled it to new
prominence and spurred renewed academic discussion of its utility. Proponents of hybrid
warfare theory argue that it provides a new and useful way to understand modern conflicts,
which often involve the simultaneous use of conventional and unconventional military tactics
in conjunction with cyber and information warfare. They assert that traditional concepts of
conflict with stark divisions between war and peace fail to capture the complexity of hybrid
tactics that disregard this distinction. However, some detractors claim that the concept of
hybrid warfare is too nebulous to be useful, and others assert that warfare has not really
changed in any fundamental sense. This remains an open and dynamic scholarly debate.
For this study, election interference is conceptualized as a tool of hybrid warfare
which can be used to undermine the strength and legitimacy of a target state. It is ideally
suited to this role thanks to its potential deniability, inexpensive nature, and effectiveness at
exploiting internal divisions within target states. Moreover, modern technologies such as
social media, the internet, and even artificial intelligence facilitate election interference by
making it easier than ever before to create and disseminate disinformation. Deterrence of
election interference is very difficult because it does not conform to traditional concepts of
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warfare. Not all election interference can be classified as hybrid warfare. However,
intervention in a state’s democratic processes can be a key component of such aggression
because of its ability to undermine the foundations of a target’s government, society, and
popular legitimacy.

An Introduction to Hybrid Warfare
Hybrid warfare is a relatively new concept that has been defined and conceptualized
in a variety of ways. The American war theorist Frank Hoffman was among the first to
address hybrid warfare, arguing that it represents a new kind of conflict characterized by the
convergence of different modes of warfare (Hoffman, 34). He asserted that adversaries would
increasingly employ a broad spectrum of conventional and unconventional forces
simultaneously to target American vulnerabilities, rather than commit to purely conventional
conflict. (Hoffman 35). Hoffman’s conceptualization of hybrid warfare continues to underpin
much of the current hybrid warfare scholarship. Although there is no consensus on an exact
definition of hybrid warfare, it is widely thought to be characterized by several key traits.
First, hybrid warfare involves a fusion of conventional and unconventional tactics
and forces. Traditional military formations can be complemented with or replaced by proxies
such as terrorist fighters, paramilitary groups, militias, or even criminal organizations
(Grigalashvili, 98). Hybrid conflicts feature several of these elements working in a
coordinated fashion towards a common goal (Kilinskas, 146). The tactics used in hybrid
warfare can be equally varied, including cyber attacks and information warfare in addition to
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a wide range of physical violence. The 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, in which
insurgent fighters used conventional weapons in conjunction with asymmetric terrorist and
guerrilla tactics, exemplifies the multimodal nature of hybrid warfare (Kilinskas, 146).
Hezbollah also expanded the conflict to the information domain, using the internet to
highlight its victories and draw attention to the suffering caused by Israeli military actions
(Jasper and Alexander, 51). Such information operations are widely believed to be an
increasingly important component of hybrid warfare.
Second, some experts argue that information warfare will become the centerpiece of
many future conflicts rather than a mere supporting tactic. The Russian general Vladimir
Gerasimov has written that society, rather than territory, is now “the object and goal of
war” (Kilinskas, 148). This implies that politics, economics, and information must be
considered weapons in the struggle to influence the people of strategically important
countries. The assertion that information warfare is an important aspect of modern conflict
has been supported by Russia’s dissemination of false narratives during its invasions of
Georgia and Crimea (Grigalashvili, 100). The 2017 U.S. National Defense Strategy concurs
with Grigalashivili’s assessment, asserting that information warfare and subversion are key
tactics that Russia uses to achieve its geopolitical objectives (Jasper and Alexander, 2).
Third, there is broad agreement that hybrid conflicts take place in an ambiguous
regime between war and peace. Such conflicts rarely feature high-intensity conventional
warfare. Hybrid attackers attempt to prevent escalation by using unconventional tactics and
cultivating ambiguity regarding the nature of the conflict. Indeed, hybrid warfare often
erodes the line between war and peace and occurs in the political “grey area” in between
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(Kilinskas, 148). In contrast to traditional conflict, hybrid warfare relies heavily on covert
operations such as espionage, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and election
interference (Ornstein, 30). This affords aggressors plausible deniability, making a robust
response more difficult to justify both domestically and internationally. Even overt hybrid
warfare actions attempt to avoid escalation to open war through the use of asymmetric tactics
(Aoi et. al., 697). This often entails using “non-kinetic” capabilities, such as cyberattacks and
information warfare, that are unlikely to elicit a conventional response. These methods
frequently exploit the ambiguous legal regimes governing cyberspace to complicate the
response of target states (Johnson, 239).
Even states that openly use force in hybrid conflicts attempt to limit the risk of highintensity war. The use of irregular units, such as militias and law enforcement agencies, can
make conventional military responses look like unwarranted escalations. China’s use of its
coast guard and maritime militias to enforce its territorial claims in the South China Sea is a
prime example of this tactic (Aoi et. al., 696). Although these forces are far more powerful
than their counterparts in any of China’s neighbors, attempts to fend them off with warships
can easily be portrayed as escalatory. Russia has also used irregular forces to limit escalation.
For instance, undercover special forces acting in conjunction with local paramilitary and
criminal groups formed a key component of Russia’s invasion of Crimea (Kilinskas, 153).
Conventional deterrence was also used, with 150,000 Russian troops stationed at the
Ukrainian border under the guise of a military exercise serving as a stark reminder of the
consequences of escalation (Kilinskas, 152). Clearly, the unconventional, ambiguous, and
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multimodal nature of hybrid warfare gives aggressors a multitude of options for attaining
their foreign policy goals while minimizing the possibility of dangerous escalation.

Hybrid Warfare as a Global Phenomenon
Hybrid warfare is a useful concept for explaining low-intensity conflict throughout
the world. For example, east Asian security experts Aoi, Futamura, and Patalano contend that
hybrid warfare is increasingly used by states in the Asia-Pacific region. They envision hybrid
warfare as the mobilization of both conventional and unconventional instruments of state
power in an effort to remain below the level of open war (Aoi et. al. 2018, 693). This strategy
has a long history in Asia but has been rendered more relevant than ever before by new
technologies (Aoi et. al. 2018, 695).
China’s force structure, doctrine, and recent behavior all suggest that hybrid warfare
is an important part of its strategy. Many Chinese observers believe that the nature of warfare
has changed, arguing “that contemporary wars are no longer about ‘using armed forces to
compel the enemy to submit to one’s will, but instead using all means, including armed force
or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the
enemy to accept one’s interests’” (Ong 2018, 749). This mindset is not an entirely new
development. For instance, the Chinese navy has a history of supplementing its conventional
forces with irregular maritime militias (Ong 2018, 747). Moreover, China has long embraced
the concept of a “people’s war” that blurs the lines between civilians and military personnel
(Ong 2018, 747). These trends have only intensified as China seeks to gain power in the
13

Asia-Pacific region. For instance, China’s maritime militias have “evolved into an enormous
twenty-first century irregular sea force” that can be used below the level of open warfare
(Ong 2018, 747). Although these militias often perform civilian tasks such as fishing, they
have received military training and are known to carry weapons and advanced
communications equipment provided by the Chinese government (Patalano 2018, 823).
China’s coast guard also has significant coercive potential, possessing dozens of heavily
armed ships, at least 24 of which displace over 3,000 tons (Patalano 2018, 822). China has
complemented these forces with “information warfare militias” that leverage the power of
non-governmental entities and ostensibly civilian organizations to disseminate propaganda
(Ong 2018, 747). Indeed, the Chinese Communist Party has enshrined such tactics in its most
recent 5 year plan, which advocates a concept of “Civil-Military Fusion” (Ong 2018, 746).
China expects “non-kinetic” tactics such as information warfare and cyberattacks to
play a leading role in future conflicts. For instance, documents produced by the People’s
Liberation Army imply that information warfare is expected to play a “leading role” in war
and to help prepare the ground before a conflict begins (Ong 2018, 746). Propaganda and
disinformation could play a critical role in justifying Chinese actions and undermining
international resolve to resist them in periods of low-intensity conflict (Patalano 2018, 827).
Chinese experts also believe that cyberattacks will play an important role in degrading enemy
military capabilities and destabilizing the politics of adversaries (Ong 2018, 746). Chinese
cyber espionage campaigns have already attempted to compromise the security of many
American companies and organizations, which could help lay the groundwork for future
cyber warfare operations (Cunningham and Touhill, 10). Cyber warfare tactics have the
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advantage of being inexpensive and deniable, making them attractive tools in hybrid conflicts
where China wishes to avoid direct confrontation. Overall, China’s development of cyber
capabilities and emphasis on the role of information warfare suggest that it expects future
conflicts to involve these non-kinetic elements. More broadly, concepts such as civil-military
fusion demonstrate that Beijing does not limit its conception of warfare to conventional
military domains. China’s capabilities, doctrine, and history all suggest that hybrid warfare is
an important part of its efforts to develop into a global superpower and assert control of the
South China Sea.

Critiques of Hybrid Warfare Theory
Although hybrid warfare theory has the potential to explain many new trends in
modern conflict, its utility has been questioned by some contemporary scholars. Expert on
Russian security and defense policy Bettina Renz claims that hybrid warfare is fundamentally
nothing new. She asserts that tactics such as information warfare, sabotage, and the use of
proxy fighters have been in use for many years, making Russia’s “hybrid” offensive in
Ukraine merely an extension of earlier trends (Renz, 2). Moreover, Russia’s success in
Ukraine was contingent upon favorable circumstances and does not prove the general utility
of a new doctrine of warfare (Renz, 2). Renz cautions against applying the concept of hybrid
warfare to Russian foreign policy in general, arguing that this oversimplifies Russian
behavior while offering little useful insight. The multitude of definitions of hybrid warfare
proposed by western observers only exacerbate this problem. Finally, Renz points out that
Russia itself has only adopted hybrid warfare to a limited extent, and considers the term itself
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a product of western propaganda (Renz, 4). This interpretation is supported by Russia’s
steadily increasing funding for conventional weapons such as tanks, aircraft, and missiles,
which suggests that its military planners are focused on preparedness for more traditional
forms of conflict (Renz, 10).
Even proponents of hybrid warfare theory have voiced some concerns. Aoi et. al.
emphasize the importance of geopolitical context and caution against attributing successful
foreign policy outcomes solely to hybrid warfare (Aoi et. al. 2018, 696). They also agree with
Renz that hybrid warfare is not entirely new and not formally enshrined in Russian doctrine
(Aoi et. al. 699). Kilinskas concurs with the assertion that hybrid warfare has significant
historical precedent, pointing out that the Soviet Union and Germany both attempted to
covertly undermine the sovereignty of their neighbors in the 20th century (Kilinskas 2016,
140).
In short, the usefulness of hybrid warfare theory remains a topic of scholarly debate.
Skeptics broadly agree that, despite sensationalized claims, hybrid warfare is neither a
universal war winning strategy nor an entirely new phenomenon. Moreover, they contend
that Russian mastery of hybrid warfare has been overstated, pointing to the fact that the
concept still has its skeptics in the Kremlin. The novelty of hybrid warfare has also been
contested, with many viewing it as a mere extension of previous trends. Although there is
some merit to these criticisms, hybrid warfare theory remains a useful way to understand
changes in modern conflict in the context of new technological and political developments.
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Emerging Hybrid Capabilities
As outlined above, many of the tactics associated with modern hybrid warfare have
been used throughout history. However, new technologies have created new vulnerabilities
which have empowered hybrid aggressors to an unprecedented extent. Information warfare is
now more potent than ever before thanks to the power of the internet to disseminate
propaganda, and the increasing military and political importance of cyberspace has created
new possibilities for foreign adversaries.
The Internet has become an indispensable part of modern life as we know it. Over the
past 5 years more online data has been generated than in the rest of human history put
together (Cunningham and Touhill, 1). The internet underpins the global economy, provides
billions of people with their main source of news, and is a key forum for political discourse.
As a result, cyberspace has become an important domain in which states attempt to attain
supremacy. Cyber attacks are now an indispensable component of hybrid warfare and will
likely play an even greater role in the future. The versatility, deniability, and effectiveness of
cyberattacks combine to make them an ideal tactic for hybrid aggressors. Such attacks are
incredibly flexible with effects ranging from the disruption of electrical grids to the theft of
classified information. (Jasper and Alexander). They can be extremely disruptive, as
demonstrated by the 2017 NotPetya virus that crippled the networks of the global shipping
giant Maersk and caused billions of dollars in damage worldwide (Cunningham and Touhill,
29). Moreover, victims of cyber warfare often have limited legal recourse given the
ambiguous nature of international law governing cyberspace (Ohlin, 7).
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Cyberattacks have played a role in several hybrid warfare campaigns thanks to their
accessibility, effectiveness, and deniability. In 2007 Russia launched a major cyberattack
against Estonia, crippling government services, news outlets, and online banking for several
weeks (Jasper and Alexander, 33). This attack demonstrated that even rudimentary cyber
operations can severely undermine the stability of an entire country. Russian invasions of
Georgia and Crimea were also accompanied by cyber warfare which aimed to weaken their
resistance (Jasper and Alexander). Cyber attacks have clearly opened up a myriad array of
new vulnerabilities that can be exploited in a hybrid war.
Artificial intelligence has the potential to tremendously increase the amount of
disinformation produced by malicious actors. One of the most concerning recent
developments is the use of AI to produce highly convincing fabricated videos known as
“deepfakes”. Such videos are produced by feeding existing images or videos of a target into a
deep learning algorithm. With enough input, these algorithms can produce high-quality video
of a target saying or doing almost anything (Cunningham and Touhill, 108). A study by the
graphics card company Nvidia even succeeded in using machine learning techniques to
fabricate high-fidelity images of people who never existed (Cunningham and Touhill, 112).
Although such manipulation has long been within the grasp of computer generated imagery,
it once required skilled animators and long periods of time. Deepfakes are far more
accessible, allowing amateurs without any specialized skills or equipment to quickly create
manipulated content (Kietzmann, 136).
At the same time, the development of social media has provided the perfect platform
for the dissemination of this disinformation. Malicious actors have learned to adroitly
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manipulate algorithms governing what content is shown to users in order to quickly spread
false narratives (Cunningham and Touhill, 88). For instance, in their attempt to interfere in
the 2016 U.S. election, Russian operatives created fake accounts that claimed to be affiliated
with the Black Lives Matter movement and the Tennessee Republican Party (Mueller, 22).
These were collectively able to accrue millions of followers and reach tens of millions of
people, in part because some of them were retweeted by prominent politicians and
commentators (Mueller, 22). Russian-sponsored internet trolls were also instrumental in
spreading false narratives that alleged, for example, that Hillary Clinton favored making
women eligible for selective service (Cunningham and Touhill, 92).
Overall, it is clear that modern technology has provided hybrid aggressors with a
formidable arsenal of new capabilities. Cyberattacks are perhaps the most serious of these
emerging threats given their comparatively low cost, deniability, and proven ability to cause
mayhem. Moreover, they are highly versatile and can be used for purposes ranging from
espionage to crippling attacks on critical infrastructure. Artificial intelligence and social
media also have the potential to be potent instruments of hybrid warfare thanks to their
ability to create and disseminate unprecedented quantities of disinformation. To summarize,
technological advances have made hybrid warfare more threatening than ever before, and
future developments are likely to exacerbate this challenge.

Hybrid Warfare and Election Interference
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Given that hybrid warfare breaks down the distinction between civilian and military
domains, many experts have expressed concern that hybrid attacks might profoundly affect
domestic politics. Mitchell Ornstein, professor of Eastern European studies at the University
of Pennsylvania, discusses the impact of hybrid warfare on the internal politics of states in
eastern Europe and examines the lessons that can be learned from their experiences. He
contends that since 2007 Russia has pursued an “all out, mainly convert, political war on the
west” (Ornstein, 10). This operation has relied on covert measures, such as support for
extreme political parties, information warfare, and hacking, which afford Russia a degree of
plausible deniability (ibid). Ornstein argues that this hybrid attack on the west aims to
destabilize western democracies, divide the European Union, and fracture alliances such as
NATO in order to weaken opposition to Russian actions (ibid). Unfortunately, responding to
this aggression is not a simple task. Although Ornstein believes that Russian hybrid warfare
began in 2007, most western leaders did not recognize that an attack was underway until the
2014 invasion of Crimea (Ornstein 47). Even now, despite overwhelming evidence, many
American politicians refuse to acknowledge Russian interference in the 2016 election.
Moreover, responses to hybrid aggression have been dubiously effective, with even the
toughest sanctions failing to change Russian behavior (Ornstein 2019, 56).
Russia’s intervention in the 2016 U.S. election can be seen as the most recent clash in
this continuing hybrid assault on western countries. Professor of Russian and eastern
European history Patryk Babiracki argues that foreign attempts to sway the presidential race
in favor of Donald Trump were part of a broader campaign of hybrid aggression (Babiracki
2018, 1). In addition to supporting the Trump campaign through selective leaks of sensitive
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information and dissemination of propaganda, Russia sought to weaken the very fabric of
American society. Much of the disinformation spread by Russian operatives sought to “blur
the lines between truth, falsehood, and reality” rather than advance any coherent narrative
(Babiracki 2018, 3). This promotion of discord and uncertainty exemplifies hybrid warfare’s
focus on degrading an adversary’s society rather than promoting one’s own (Babiracki 2018,
4).
Scholar Darin Johnson addresses the implications of the threat of election interference
for the United States. He argues that the employment of hybrid tactics by America’s enemies
compel it to address festering domestic problems as if they were national security
vulnerabilities. Failure to do this can create opportunities for foreign adversaries. For
instance, Johnson argues that racial strife in the United States created a weakness that was
exploited by Russian operatives during the 2016 election. Indeed, he claims that “racial
division was fundamental to Russia’s interference campaign”, with over half of Russian ads
on Facebook attempting to leverage this disunity (Johnson 2019, 203). Moreover, much of
Russia’s disinformation activity was more concerned with increasing racial and political
animosity than with promoting a particular candidate (Johnson 2019, 202). This view is
corroborated by the fact that Russia supported both sides of many hot-button issues. For
instance, the Internet Research Agency collaborated with white supremacists to spread
hateful and divisive rhetoric while simultaneously encouraging Black Americans to form
armed self-defense organizations (Johnson 2019, 202). Russian agents also attempted to
suppress minority turnout by falsely alleging racist behavior on the part of Democratic
politicians such as Beto O’Rourke, Bernie Sanders, and Elizabeth Warren (Johnson 2019,
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209). This relentless exploitation of racial divisions by Russian operatives convinced Johnson
that these societal fractures must be considered national security vulnerabilities with the
potential to undermine American resilience to foreign aggression (Johnson 2019, 249).
Although Russian attempts to spread discord in the United States are not
unprecedented, the interference campaign of 2016 leveraged new technologies to be far more
effective than previous efforts. With powerful new tools such as cyberattacks and internetfacilitated information warfare, hybrid strategies pose a serious threat against which physical
distance is no defense. States can no longer rely solely on their militaries for security but
must look to strengthen their societies as well. Just as globalization has reduced the
significance of state borders, hybrid warfare threatens to reduce the significance of the front
line, exposing economic, societal, political, and military targets to unconventional attack at
any time and in any place. Election interference, which represents a direct attack on the
foundations of societal order and government legitimacy, is one of the most salient and
concerning aspects of this new paradigm of warfare. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to deter
due to its deniability and ambiguous standing in international law. To combat hybrid threats
such as election interference, western democracies must strengthen their societies and present
a united front against foreign interference.

Introduction to Election Interference
Election interference has a long history as an instrument of foreign policy. Despite the
common perception that elections are purely domestic in nature, in reality they are
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inextricably linked with international relations. Different candidates and parties often have
radically different policies on issues that affect outside actors, creating strong incentives for
election inference. For this reason, states have often attempted to sway electoral outcomes in
other countries throughout the past few decades (Ohlin, 10). In their book Rules and Allies,
Bubeck and Marinov define election interference as “a deliberate attempt by a foreign
government to change the electoral rule or the election outcome” (Bubeck and Marinov, 45).
As this definition implies, Bubeck and Marinov categorize electoral interventions into two
groups: candidate interventions and process interventions (ibid). States can combine these
tactics to achieve their goals, influencing either the appeal of particular candidates, the rules
of the election, or both. The authors argue that states intervene in elections for two main
reasons: pragmatic geopolitical concerns and normative preferences for democracy (Bubeck
and Marinov, 12). Overall, they find that election interference is quite common, occurring in
approximately 65% of their sample of post World War II elections (Bubeck and Marinov,
112). Most scholars concur that election interfere has been a common phenomenon in recent
history, especially during periods of great power competition such as the Cold War (Ohlin,
10).
The election interference literature suggests that the appeal of intervention depends
on two key characteristics of the target state: political polarization and strategic importance to
the intervener. Unsurprisingly, election intervention seems to be more likely in states that are
strategically important to the intervener (Bubeck and Marinov, 55). It is also widely agreed
that political polarization will create incentives for states to intervene in elections (Bubeck
and Marinov, Johnson). The more candidates’ policy positions differ, the more an intervener
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can make a difference by influencing the result. The average difference between candidates
tends to be larger in polarized elections. Political polarization can also encourage election
interference by making it easier (Johnson). In many polarized countries opportunistic
politicians attempt to align themselves with outside actors in exchange for support, making it
easier for interveners to promote certain policy outcomes (Ornstein, 6). This dynamic may
have encouraged interference in the 2016 U.S. election, in which candidate Trump openly
asked for Russian support (Ohlin, 192). Overall, existing scholarship suggests that election
interference will be appealing when the target is strategically important and politically
polarized.
On the other hand, Bubeck and Marinov argue that some states have normative
preferences for democracy that impel them to intervene in elections in which they they have
little geostrategic interest. These competing motivations can sometimes produce seemingly
incoherent policy. For instance, in the waning days of the Mubark regime, the United States
provided support for democratic organizations in Egypt while simultaneously financing an
authoritarian government that was actively repressing them (Bubeck and Marinov, 16). Thus,
in its effort to promote democracy while continuing to advance its geopolitical interests, the
American government pursued a process intervention that favored the opposition and a
candidate intervention that favored the incumbent.
States often choose to balance process and candidate interventions for more
pragmatic reasons as well. For example, even if a state has no intrinsic preference for
democracy, it might attempt to promote a fair election process if it wishes to help a
challenger defeat an incumbent (Bubeck and Marinov, 50). This is often an effective tactic in
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conjunction with support for a specific candidate, given that reducing bias “makes the
relationship between the support for a certain candidate within the electorate and the final
vote share more direct” (Bubeck and Marinov, 53). Thus, every dollar spent supporting a
candidate counts for more if the electoral process is fair. More broadly, election interference
is generally carried out using a variety of tactics simultaneously in order to maximize its
effectiveness (Ohlin, 10). For instance, states may support hostile candidates in order to
divide opposition to their preferred contender. Russia’s intervention in the 2016 American
election exemplified this tactic, supporting Bernie Sanders in order to siphon votes away
from Hillary Clinton (Ohlin, 13). This combination of a variety strategies makes sense given
that any one tool of election interference tends to suffer from diminishing returns.

Hybridized Election Interference

Election interference tends to have distinct characteristics when deployed as a tool of
hybrid warfare. This hybridized election interference is defined by its concern with inflicting
damage on the target and by its integration into a broader hybrid warfare effort. The primary
goal of such interference is simply to inflict as much damage as possible on the target state.
Rather than encourage the implementation of a particular policy, it aims to diminish the
target’s ability to enact any coherent policy. This allows the intervener to gain an advantage
in the international arena. Hybridized interference is likely to adopt both candidate and
process interventions, but these will be geared towards the erosion of political institutions
and societal cohesion. For instance, an intervener may promote anti-democratic, extremist, or
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populist candidates who would undermine a target’s political system while simultaneously
fomenting the discontent, division, and cynicism that allow such candidates to flourish. Thus,
although its goals are radically different from tradition election interference, hybridized
interference can use similar tactics.

Defense against Election Interference
Some scholarly literature and government sponsored research has considered the
question of how to defend against foreign election interference. Unfortunately, many factors
conspire to make effective countermeasures exceedingly difficult. Election interference is
almost impossible to deter and the domains in which it is carried out tend to favor offensive
operations.
Deterrence of election interference is extremely difficult for a variety of reasons.
Because election interference is generally covert, states engaging in this behavior will enjoy
plausible deniability in many cases. This makes attribution of election interference difficult,
which is a serious impediment to a credible deterrence policy. Even if a nation can determine
the identity of its attacker, finding an effective response is difficult. Criminal proceedings
against individuals engaged in election interference will be impractical because interveners
will simply claim innocence and refuse to extradite them (Johnson, 242). The ambiguity of
international law complicates the problem of deterring election interference. In fact, there is
no consensus that election interference is even illegal under current frameworks (Ohlin, 3).
The well-defined international norms regarding attacks carried out by conventional forces
simply do not exist in the realm of election interference.
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Defense against information and cyber warfare is also problematic. The very
characteristics of western democracies, such as openness and freedom of speech, can make it
harder to crack down on disinformation (Chivvis, 319). The nature of democracy, which
thrives on contested elections in which different policy positions are offered, will always
make election interference a tempting option for foreign actors that wish to gain influence
(Chivvis, 319). Even if western democracies were not constrained by these factors,
combating cyber warfare and disinformation would be difficult because these tactics
inherently favor the aggressor. For instance, cyber attackers only need to succeed once to
compromise a system, whereas defenders must foil every attempted intrusion (Cunningham
and Touhill). Moreover, some of the most capable malware ever devised is freely available
on the internet, meaning that even relatively primitive attackers have cutting edge capabilities
(Cunningham and Touhill, 20).
However, despite the difficulty of combating election interference, some solutions
have been proposed. As Darin Johnson and others have articulated, addressing internal
divisions may help limit the vulnerability of western societies to foreign meddling.
Eliminating the sources of these divisions may be difficult, but could eliminate some of the
vulnerabilities that foreign adversaries have exploited (Johnson, 256). Encouraging social
media companies to remove deceptive or hateful posts and passing legislation requiring
online political adds to adhere to certain standards of truthfulness could also help combat
foreign disinformation campaigns (Johnson, 255). In a similar vein, efforts to combat
corruption, raise awareness of foreign disinformation campaigns, and limit corrosive political
polarization could make it harder for would-be interveners to influence political discourse
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(Chivvis, 319). Less ambitious proposals suggest that investments in cybersecurity could
yield significant dividends. In his testimony before Congress, Frank Taylor, executive
director of a nonprofit cybersecurity organization, advocated for increased cybersecurity
efforts for political campaigns (United States, 14). This could limit the ability of foreign
actors to influence election by leaking stolen information or attempting to blackmail
candidates. Defending against election interference with complete success will always be
difficult, but there are certainly steps that states can take to reduce their vulnerability.
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Chapter 2
Research Design and Methodology

This Independent Study seeks to investigate election interference as a tactic of hybrid
warfare. As outlined in Chapter 1, neither election interference nor hybrid warfare are
entirely new phenomena. However, modern technologies such as social media and cyber
espionage have greatly increased the threat of election interference by malicious actors. Such
interference can be used by foreign adversaries as part of a broader campaign of hybrid
warfare. Rather than seeking to influence the result of an election, hybridized election
interference primarily aims to undermine the foundations of a target’s society by
exacerbating internal divisions. This could provide an intervener with a significant
geopolitical advantage by diminishing the target’s ability to enact effective foreign policy.
Hybridized interference also poses a grave threat to the legitimacy and stability of democratic
governments, calling into question the elections that form the basis for their existence.
The independent variable in this study is the level of hybridized election interference
conducted by a foreign state. The dependent variable is the degree to which a target of
election interference offers tangible foreign policy concessions to this adversary. There is one
intervening variable: the degree to which a target’s internal divisions intensify during and
immediately after an election. I will employ the comparative case study methodology to
examine two primary hypotheses. I hypothesize that hybridized election interference will
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intensify internal divisions in the target state, and that these divisions will make states more
likely to offer foreign policy concessions to adversaries.

Hypotheses and Causal Mechanisms
In this Independent Study, I will test two primary hypotheses. Firstly, I hypothesize
that hybridized election interference will lead to an intensification of political and social
divisions within a target state. Indeed, promotion of these divisions is often the primary tactic
of hybrid interveners. Secondly, I hypothesize that these internal divisions will make a state
more likely to offer foreign policy concessions to its adversaries. This will be the case
because states consumed by internal divisions will be less willing and able to compete with
their opponents in the international arena. Thus, foreign policy concessions are a result of the
intense internal divisions that hybridized election interference seeks to exacerbate.

Figure 1: Research Design for the Study of Election Interference

Independent
Variable:
Intensity of
Hybridized Election
Interference

+

Intervening
Variable:
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Dependent Variable:
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Foreign Policy
Concessions to
Intervening State

Independent Variable
The independent variable in this study is the level of hybridized election interference.
Existing literature has identified information warfare operations, such as the dissemination of
propaganda on social media, as key aspects of hybridized interference (Johnson; Mueller).
For this reason, information warfare activities should be a good indicator of the overall
intensity of an election intervention. I will therefore create an index of three metrics related
to information warfare in order to measure hybridized election interference. Each of these
will be coded low, medium, or high using a scale ranging from 0 to 2. The sum of these
numbers will indicate the intensity of hybridized election interference, which can range from
a minimum value of 0 to a maximum of 6. Because election interference campaigns may
begin well in advance of the vote that they seek to influence (Babiracki), this study will
consider election interference activities starting up to 1 year before the election of interest
and continuing through the last day of voting.
The prevalence of foreign information warfare on social media is among the most
important indicators of election interference (Cunningham and Touhill). Such activity often
involves the use of “troll” accounts or “content farms” to promote a narrative or sow
division. State-sponsored efforts to disseminate false or misleading information on social
media are also considered examples of information warfare. In each case, I will assess the
extent to which these behaviors influenced voters in the target state. The intensity of
information warfare on social media will be coded as high (2) if large numbers of voters were
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influenced. Signs of high-intensity information warfare would include widespread belief in
false narratives promoted by foreign governments or frequent examples of foreign “troll”
accounts reaching large numbers of people. If online information warfare clearly took place
but was more limited in influence, its intensity will be coded as medium (1). Finally, if there
is no evidence that information warfare on social media reached a significant number of
people, its intensity will be coded as low (0).
I will also examine the reach of foreign information warfare on more traditional
media platforms. Viewership of propaganda mouthpieces such as Russia Today, Sputnik, and
the Global Times in countries experiencing election interference could be a key indicator of
the success of foreign governments in disseminating their narrative (Templeman). Foreign
actors may also co-opt local media outlets through bribes or collusion with influential
business leaders. The intensity of foreign information warfare through traditional media will
be coded as high (2) if media outlets that are heavily influenced by foreign governments play
a major role in shaping the narrative surrounding an election. It foreign media outlets have
significant influence but are still overshadowed by independent sources of information, the
intensity of information warfare through traditional media will be coded as medium (1). This
metric will be coded as low (0) if foreign media sources fail to have a noticeable impact on
public discourse surrounding the election being studied.
Finally, foreign attempts to influence the political process through cyber warfare will
be considered. The number of significant politically motivated cyberattacks attributable to
foreign adversaries will be determined. If there are no such attacks this metric will be coded
as low (0) and if there are one or two it will be coded as medium (1). Three or more attacks
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will be coded as high (2). Cyber attacks will be considered politically motivated if they are
directed against political parties, candidates, or electoral institutions. However, attacks that
merely gather intelligence without attempting to inflict damage or disseminate compromising
material will not be counted.

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this Independent Study is the degree to which a state’s
foreign policy becomes more favorable to the country that interfered in its election.
Achieving foreign policy concessions through the intensification of another state’s internal
divisions may be an important goal of many hybridized election interference campaigns.
Because these divisions may last for a significant period of time, this study will consider
foreign policy changes made up to two years after an election in which interference occurred.
Foreign policy concessions could take many forms.
I will focus on three main metrics to assess changes in a state’s foreign policy.
The first metric that will be examined is military posture, which encompasses doctrine,
military spending, and participation in military conflicts that involve the intervening state or
its allies. The second is economic policy towards the intervening state, including sanctions,
tariffs, and openness to trade. Domestic economic policies such as stimulus spending and
interest rate adjustments will not be considered. The final aspect of foreign policy that will be
examined is a state’s diplomatic alignment. This includes factors such as alliance structure,
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participation in international organizations, and willingness to cooperate with the intervening
state.
Each of these aspects of foreign policy will be coded with a number between -2 and
2, with the former signifying a strong shift to a more assertive foreign policy and the latter
signifying major concessions. A value of zero denotes the absence of a policy change. These
numbers will then be added to create an index of foreign policy concessions to foreign
interveners, with a maximum value of 6 denoting sweeping concessions and a minimum
value of -6 indicating a radical shift to a more assertive foreign policy.

Intervening Variable
The intervening variable in this study is the intensification of internal divisions
caused by election interference in a target state. The intensification of these divisions is often
a primary goal of election interference campaigns. Potential increases in three key aspects of
internal divisions will be examined and coded as low, medium, or high using a scale ranging
from 0 to 2. This will be accomplished by the comparing pre- and post-election divisions in
each category. The resulting numerical values will then be added to create an index of
internal division intensification on a scale ranging from 0 to 6.
The first aspect of internal divisions that I will analyze is political polarization. This
metric seeks to capture the level of division between a country’s main political parties.
Fortunately political polarization is often easily observable. Key indicators of increased
polarization would include heightened partisan controversy on key policy issues, widening
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gaps between the priorities of different parties, and routine passage of legislation through
purely party-line votes. Increased polarization of public opinion along party lines could also
indicate increased political divisions. On the other hand, effective inter-party cooperation
would suggest that these divisions have not worsened.
Existing literature has also suggested that racial or ethnic animosity can be a key
indicator of internal divisions (Johnson). Although these tensions can be quite difficult to
measure, polling data gathered by organizations such as Pew Research and YouGov helps
elucidate how citizens of various countries believe race relations have evolved over time.
Major protests or incidents of racist violence may also suggest an increase in racial tensions.
However, events of this nature often have domestic causes and cannot be assumed to result
from election interference.
Finally, increased political extremism could indicate an intensification of internal
divisions. Signs of extremism include widespread support for fringe political parties or
movements, a decline in support for the rule of law, and any instances of political violence.
Attempts by political actors to undermine key institutions or unlawfully exercise power
would also suggest an increase in political extremism. Lastly, polling data indicating that
large segments of the population view political opponents as enemies or consider political
violence acceptable could be a key early warning of heightened political extremism.

Methodology
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This Independent Study will employ the comparative case study methodology. This
approach is the best choice because it allows each instance of election interference to be
studied and understood in great detail. This is a crucial advantage because the variables of
interest in this study are often complex and nuanced. Quantifying the level of election
interference, for example, requires detailed analysis of a wide range of activities carried out
by a foreign country’s various government agencies and proxies. The case study approach
facilitates this work and allows research difficulties stemming from the covert nature of
election interference campaigns to be overcome. Moreover, it provides the thorough
understanding of a wide range of military, diplomatic, and economic factors that is necessary
to code variables such as foreign policy changes. Thus, the case study approach is well suited
to dealing with the time consuming process of understating complex variables.
The comparative case study approach is also ideal for understanding how variables
change over time (Kaarbo and Beasley, 379). This is important because context matters when
analyzing changes in the variables investigated by this study. For instance, simply knowing a
state’s policy at a certain point in time reveals very little about how that policy may have
changed as a result of foreign election interference. Evaluating the hypotheses proposed in
this study requires knowledge of how the variables change over time.
It should be noted that the comparative case study approach can have drawbacks in
select circumstances. Critics charge that it cannot prove a causal relationship between two
variables because it is impossible to verify that the results were not caused by other factors
not considered by the study. A comparative case study method has the additional drawback of
examining only a small number of cases, which makes it less likely that the results will be
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statistically significant. It can also be quite easy for scholars to misinterpret case study results
in order to support conclusions for which there is little evidence (Kaarbo and Beasley, 371).
On the other hand, the versatility of the case study approach and its ability to test theoretical
arguments even in the absence of large datasets set it apart from other methods (Kaarbo and
Beasley, 375). Overall, a comparative case study approach is the best way to test my
hypothesis and should provide some useful initial results.

Case Studies
This Independent Study will examine the 2016 American Presidential Election, the
2018 local elections in Taiwan, and the 2016 Brexit referendum. These cases were selected
because they represent a broad range of election interference campaigns with a wide variety
of target states and interveners. This should ensure a high degree of external validity for any
conclusions drawn from this study. The cases were also chosen in order to provide a high
level of variance in the intensity of election interference so that analysis of its correlation
with the other variables of interest can be performed. All of the selected cases will take place
in countries with robust democratic elections given that interference in an election whose
outcome is predetermined would have little meaningful impact.

United States Presidential Election, 2016
Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election is one of the most well
known examples of foreign electoral meddling. It is also among the most significant given
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the crucial role played by the United States in the world and the major changes brought about
as a result of Donald Trump’s victory. Thanks to a wealth of official publications, such as the
reports produced by Robert Mueller’s Special Counsel investigation and by the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, it is possible to build an unusually deep understanding of how
election interference occurred in this case. Survey data for the United States is also more
detailed than what is available in most other countries, which makes it substantially easier to
code variables for the 2016 election cycle. Thus, this case provides a unique opportunity to
improve our understanding of hybridized election interference.

Taiwanese Local Elections, 2018
Over the past several years few democracies have faced more external pressure at the
hands of foreign adversaries than Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China considers Taiwan
to be an inseparable part of its territory and has engaged in a far-reaching campaign to
prevent the island from moving towards official independence. Many observers believe that
information warfare and election interference have played a key role in this effort. There
have been numerous allegations that China interfered in Taiwan’s 2018 local elections in
order to weaken Tsai Ing-wen and the China-skeptic Democratic Progressive Party
(Templeman). This case should provide a good example of the upper extreme of election
interference intensity given that China is very close to Taiwan both geographically and
culturally, is vastly larger and more powerful, and considers unification with the island to be
a key foreign policy objective.
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“Brexit” Referendum, 2016
The United Kingdom’s decision to withdraw from the European Union in a 2016
referendum was one of the most surprising political occurrences of the decade. This shocking
outcome led to profound changes in the UK’s relationship with Europe and may have
seriously undermined the cohesion of the EU. It has been widely suggested that Russia
attempted to promote the Leave campaign in order to exacerbate divisions between its rivals.
The Brexit case provides a useful example to study for several reasons. Thanks to the large
number of English-language sources available, it is easier to study than many alternatives.
Moreover, it provides an example of a referendum in which issues rather than candidates
were on the ballot. It also may feature an example of a lower-intensity election interference
campaign compared to the interventions in American and Taiwanese elections. Thus, the
inclusion of the Brexit referendum provides a useful diversity in the cases that are examined.
In short, this case is worthy of inclusion due to the wealth of available information, credible
claims of Russian interference, and unique nature of the election being studied.
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Chapter 3
The 2016 Presidential Elections in the United States

The 2016 presidential election was one of the most contentious in American history. It
featured a contest between two starkly different candidates, both of whom were unusually
unpopular. Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton was almost universally seen as the
frontrunner throughout the campaign given her advantages in experience, political
connections, and more conventional policies. On the other hand, Donald Trump was an
unlikely candidate with no experience in government and a penchant for inflammatory
rhetoric that many believed would damage his chances. The American intelligence
community has reached a near-consensus that Russia embarked on an intense and farreaching campaign of election interference designed to undermine Clinton’s legitimacy and
exacerbate America’s internal political divisions (Mueller). A wide range of tactics were used
to damage Clinton and promote Trump, including cyberattacks on the Democratic Party,
disinformation on social media, and attempts to compromise the voting systems of all 50
states (United States). On election day this interference seemed to pay off, with Trump
wining an improbable victory that divided the country to an almost unprecedented extent.
This case study will attempt to put the events of 2016 in context, determine the intensity of
Russian information warfare, and elucidate the extent to which Russian activities worsened
America’s divisions. It will then evaluate American foreign policy changes following the
election to see if Russian interference helped secure any meaningful concessions.
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Two main sources inform my analysis of Russian election interference. The first is
officially titled “Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In the 2016
Presidential Election” (hereafter known as the Mueller Report). This document provides a
thorough overview of Russian activity in the 2016 election and investigates allegations of
Trump campaign collaboration with Russian actors. I also draw from the Senate Intelligence
Committee Report (officially entitled “Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference
in the 2016 U.S. Election”). This bipartisan document provides a detailed analysis of Russian
efforts to interfere in the 2016 election and describes what steps could be taken to prevent
such activity in the future.

Background: Political Context
The United States has a long history of geopolitical competition with Russia.
Although the end of the Cold War brought about improved relations, these gains have been
largely reversed under Vladimir Putin’s tenure. Putin, who has continuously occupied the
office of either president or prime minister since 2000, has sought to reassert Russia’s status
as a great power capable of exerting hegemonic influence in its eastern European “near
abroad” (Nalbandov, 8). Russian military spending has increasing accordingly, growing from
28 billion dollars at the beginning of Putin’s tenure to over 91 billion in 2015 (Rutland, 42).
Putin has been a harsh critic of liberalism, arguing that a rules-based international order is
nothing more than a ploy to increase American influence. Putin’s stated belief that “the
collapse of the Soviet Union was biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”
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contextualizes his overarching policy goals of strengthening Russia, restoring parity with the
west, and carving out a Russian sphere of influence in eastern Europe (Nalbandov, 19).
Russia’s intensified involvement in military conflicts in recent decades has also
precipitated a confrontation with the United States and its allies. The first major crisis took
place in 2008, when Russian forces intervened in the conflict between the Georgian military
and separatist groups in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Böller and Werle, 322).
Georgia’s army was quickly pushed back and Russia quickly recognized the independence of
the two breakaway regions, which remained occupied by Russian troops even after the
cessation of hostilities (Böller and Werle, 322). The American response to this use of force
was muted, with the Bush administration condemning Russia’s actions but failing to
implement sanctions (Böller and Werle, 322). The 2014 annexation of Crimea had a far more
serious effect of US-Russian relations. The United States and its European allies harshly
criticized this move and implemented economic sanctions against Russia (Böller and Werle,
323). They also intensified military cooperation with several eastern European states in order
to deter further Russian aggression (Böller and Werle, 323). Russian interests have also
clashed with those of the United States in the Syrian civil war. Russia intervened
dramatically on behalf of Syrian dictator Bashar Al-Assad in 2015, using its air force to turn
the tide of the conflict and prevent a rebel victory (Rutland, 43).
Russia’s current practice of using information warfare can also be traced to the Cold
War. Soviet intelligence operatives attempted to leverage divisions in American society in
order to weaken the United States and undermine the appeal of liberal democracy more
generally (Johnson, 210). Racial divisions were often exploited by the KGB, which alleged
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government involvement in Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination (Johnson, 210). Soviet
disinformation also falsely accused the United States of manufacturing the AIDS virus and
encouraging the 1979 siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca while claiming that the CIA
murdered President John F. Kennedy (United States, 82). Given that many observers have
compared contemporary US-Russia tensions to the Cold War, it is perhaps unsurprising that
Russia has drawn on Soviet disinformation tactics to further its geopolitical competition with
the west.
Unfortunately, several characteristics of American society appear to have heightened
its vulnerability to disinformation. On a structural level, modern social media platforms are
ideal conduits for fake news due to their tendency to bring like-minded people together and
present them with content that reinforces their existing views (Bovet and Makse, 1). The
structure of social media networks allows fringe narrative can incubate within some isolated,
homogenous, group whose members will be inclined to believe it. Due to its sensational
nature, false news often spreads faster and more broadly than the truth while factchecking
lags far behind (Bovet and Makse, 1). This problem may be exacerbated by extreme political
polarization and widespread domestic discord.

Overview of Russian Interference in the 2016 Election
Russia’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 election consisted of three main activities:
information warfare conducted through social media, cyberattacks and leaks of stolen
documents, and efforts to compromise the integrity of voting systems (United States).
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According to the Senate Intelligence Committee Report, these actions were carried out by
several Russian intelligence agencies including the GRU (military intelligence), the FSB
(domestic counterintelligence) and the SVR (foreign intelligence) (Uhlmann and McCombie,
681). The Internet Research Agency (IRA), a private St. Petersburg-based company owned
by pro-Putin oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin, was also heavily involved in information warfare
activities (Uhlmann and McCombie, 681). It is important to note that Russian interference
was opportunistic and decentralized, with little inter-agency coordination among the
Kremlin’s intelligence services. Indeed, the American intelligence community believes that
both the GRU and the FSB independently compromised the DNC’s servers and leaked
sensitive documents that were damaging to Hillary Clinton (Uhlmann and McCombie, 682).
This duplication of efforts suggests that Russian interference was not guided by any
overarching master plan, but instead involved individual agencies exploiting weakness as
they appeared.

Independent Variable: Russian Election Interference
Russia’s campaign to undermine trust in the 2016 election may have started as early
as 2014, when several IRA operatives went on intelligence-gathering trips to the United
States (Mueller, 21). This would mark the beginning of a concerted information warfare
campaign that sought to undermine American democracy and stoke internal divisions.
Overall, the intensity of Russian election interference was high and is coded as 4 on a scale
from 0 to 6. Russian social media accounts purporting to represent American individuals or
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organizations were viewed by tens of millions of Americans and were often quoted by public
figures and mainstream media outlets. As such, the intensity of Russian information warfare
online was coded as 2 out of 2. The intensity of Russian cyber warfare is also coded as 2 out
of 2 due to the significant number of impactful, politically motivated cyberattacks that took
place during the election. Finally, the intensity of Russian interference through traditional
media is coded as 0 due to a lack of evidence that Russia employed such tactics.
The Internet Research Agency was one of the most prominent foreign distributors of
disinformation in the 2016 election cycle. According to the Mueller Report, most of its
activities involved fabricating online American personas that could spread disinformation or
sow division while appearing to be real Americans (Mueller, 22). The IRA went to
considerable lengths to make these “troll” accounts seem legitimate. Employees were told to
create posts detailing the everyday lives and hobbies of their American alter-egos in an
attempt to make fake accounts look like real people even upon close inspection (United
States, 96). IRA operatives received extensive training on American culture and were
required to study thousands of online posts in order to gain familiarity with the behavior of
American internet users (United States, 99). IRA operations were extensive as well as
sophisticated. The agency employed over 400 people as of 2015 and was active on nearly
every major social media platform, including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube
(Mueller, 22). This appears to be in keeping with Russia’s overall strategy of inundating a
target with so many conflicting falsehoods that the very idea of objective truth is undermined.
Many IRA accounts achieved remarkable success in spreading the disinformation
under the guise of legitimate American political discourse. The Senate Intelligence
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Committee report highlights the Twitter profile @TEN_GOP, an IRA account which
purported to represent the Tennessee Republican Party. This account accrued over 150,000
followers before being taken down in 2017 and was retweeted by prominent conservative
figures including Donald Trump Jr., Kellyanne Conway, and Micheal Flynn (United States,
54). The real Twitter profile of the Tennessee Republican Party (@tngop) was overshadowed
by its Russian-sponsored counterpart and accumulated fewer than 14,000 followers as a
result (United States, 54). The Mueller Report concludes that IRA social media accounts
collectively “reached tens of millions of U.S. persons” (Mueller, 26). Individual Facebook
groups such as “United Muslims of American”, “Being Patriotic”, and “Secure Borders”
were each followed by over 100,000 American users (Mueller, 26).
The IRA also worked to take advantage of American political organizations. For
instance, the IRA persona “BlackFist” hired a self-defense instructor to teach Black people
how to protect themselves from law enforcement (Mueller, 32). Russian operatives also
attempted, with varying degrees of success, to organize pro-Trump rallies in Pennsylvania,
Florida, and New York (Mueller, 31).
The characteristics of IRA information warfare suggest that intensifying America’s
internal divisions was a key objective for Russia. For instance, its operatives ran accounts on
both sides of the political spectrum and often expressed views that were diametrically
opposed to each other (United States, 34). Such behavior would be difficult to explain if
promoting a particular candidate was Russia’s only goal. However, it seems quite logical as a
tactic to make public discourse regarding contentious issues such as race, immigration, and
gun control even more acrimonious. According to a 2017 Intelligence Community
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Assessment, Russia even planned a campaign to delegitimize the results of the election both
through official diplomatic statements and social media disinformation in the event of a
Clinton victory (United States, 35). This suggests that undermining faith in American
democracy was an important goal for Russian intelligence services regardless of the results
of the election. Russian operatives also demonstrated a keen awareness of the controversies
of American politics and made a concerted effort to target racial divisions (Johnson, 193).
Indeed, the Senate Intelligence Committee Report found that African Americans more
intensely targeted by IRA information operations than any other group (United States, 108).
Although it is clear that Russia attempted to promote Trump and undermine Clinton, making
American political discourse even more acrimonious was also an important objective.
The sophistication and wide reach of Russian information warfare efforts are
sufficient for the intensity of information warfare to be coded as 2 (high). Russian
disinformation was present on nearly every major social media platform and was viewed by
tens of millions of American voters. Moreover, the messages of IRA accounts sometimes
gained traction even in mainstream news sources when their statements were erroneously
attributed to real Americans. The fact that some Russian social media profiles, such as
@TEN_GOP, were able to overpower their legitimate counterparts demonstrates the success
of IRA disinformation in shaping the opinions of at least some Americans.

Russian Cyber Operations
Russia complemented its disinformation campaign with cyber operations intended to
undermine both Hillary Clinton and overall faith in the integrity of the election. The intensity
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of Russian cyber warfare in the 2016 election is coded as 2 (high) based on the large number
of politically motivated cyberattacks that were conducted by Russian intelligence services.
According to the Mueller Report, the GRU compromised computer networks belonging to
both the Democratic National Committee and the Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee in April of 2016 (Mueller, 4). Russian operatives also gained access to the email
accounts of dozens of Clinton Campaign volunteers and employees including campaign
chairman John Podesta (United States 564). These hacking operations appear to have been
sophisticated and far-reaching. The Mueller Report found that the GRU created two custom
malware programs, referred to as “X-Agent” and “X-Tunnel”, in order to collect and
exfiltrate data from the DCCC and DNC (Mueller, 38). In total, Russian intelligence officers
were able to steal thousands of documents and emails from the DNC, DCCC, and Clinton
Campaign (Mueller, 40).
GRU operatives made a concerted effort to disseminate documents stolen through
these cyberattacks using the online personas “DCLeaks” and “Guccifer 2.0” (Mueller, 41).
Both went to significant lengths to conceal their connection to Russia. DCLeaks claimed to
be a transparency-focused group of American “hacktivists” who wished to expose the corrupt
behavior of politicians (United States, 578). It’s website was purchased using bitcoin and
registered using an anonymizing service in order to mask GRU involvement (United States,
579). DCLeaks remained active throughout the election cycle and its page was viewed over 1
million times before it was shut down in 2017 (United States, 579).
Guccifer 2.0 seems to have been created in response to allegations of Russian
involvement in cyberattacks on the DNC and DCCC (United States, 583). The persona
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claimed to be a lone Romain hacker and ultimately released thousands of stolen documents
from democratic servers (Mueller, 43). Guccifer 2.0 also attempted to reach out to journalists
in order to disseminate hacked materials, in some cases even providing access to DCLeaks
resources (Mueller, 43). This behavior has led the American Intelligence Community to
believe that DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 were both operated by the same group of GRU agents
(Mueller 43).
Documents widely believed to have been stolen in Russian cyberattacks were also
published on third-party sites such as WikiLeaks (Mueller, 41). According to the Senate
Intelligence Committee Report, WikiLeaks actively collaborated with the GRU to
promulgate stolen documents as effectively as possible (United States, 556). The timing with
which these documents were released also appears to have been calculated to maximize
political impact. On July 22, three days prior to the Democratic National Convention,
WikiLeaks published a batch of over 20,000 documents that it had obtained from Russian
sources (Lam, 2176). Many of these emails revealed damaging internal conversations, such
as a discussion among Campaign officials regarding how to best undermine Bernie Sanders’
bid for the Democratic nomination (Lam, 2177). On October 7th, a batch of emails stolen
from Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta was released by WikiLeaks a mere hour after
news of Donald Trump’s damaging comments on “Access Hollywood” came to light
(Mueller, 5). The leaked documents included sensitive internal communications that appeared
to be quite unflattering to the Clinton Campaign. For instance, participants in an email
exchange that included Clinton’s Communications Director insinuated that Catholicism
appeals to conservatives due to “the systematic thought and severely backwards gender
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relations” (Lam, 2178). On November 7th, the day before the election, WikiLeaks published
thousands of additional DNC emails (Lam, 2178). Some of these were damaging to Hillary
Clinton herself, suggesting that she may have violated ethical guidelines in attempting to
solicit donations to the US pavilion at the 2010 World Exhibition (Lam, 2178). In short,
WikiLeaks seems to have been implicated in an intense GRU effort to disseminate stolen
hacked documents that would undermine Clinton’s legitimacy and electoral prospects.
Russian intelligence services are also alleged to have probed weakness in state voting
systems (United States, 9). While there is no evidence that any votes were manipulated on
election day (United States, 12), some experts have argued that by demonstrating its ability to
access election infrastructure, Russia sought to undermine confidence in the integrity of the
election (United States, 35).
Overall, the intensity of Russian cyber attacks is coded as 2 (high). This rating is
appropriate in light of the fact that at least three cyberattacks observed by U.S. intelligence
agencies had clear political implications and were not limited to intelligence gathering. On
the other hand, there is no evidence to suggest that Russian activity had any direct impact on
traditional media outlets in the United States, so intensity of foreign interference through
mainstream media outlets is coded as 0. As previously stated, the intensity of Russian
disinformation was coded as 2 (high) due to its prevalence on a large number of social media
platforms and its ability to influence broader public discourse. Thus, the overall intensity of
Russian election interference is coded as 4 out of 6.
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Intervening Variable: American Internal Divisions
Assessing the degree to which Russian election interference might have worsened
American political and social divisions is a difficult task. This study finds that American
internal divisions increased notably throughout the election and codes the intensification of
such division as 3 out of 6. Specifically, the intensification of American political divisions is
coded as 2 (high) and the intensification of racial tensions is coded as 1 (moderate). The
intensification of political extremism is coded as 0 (low), given that there is little evidence to
suggest an increase in extremist beliefs during or immediately after the election.
This study draws on public opinion polling to measure various aspects of political and
social division within the United States. A wealth of available data suggests that in the wake
of the 2016 election Americans were more divided than ever before. A Pew Research survey
found that Donald Trump was historically unpopular as president-elect, with only 39% of
respondents approving of his management of his transition to the White House and 41%
approving of his high level appointments (Doherty, 1). These numbers were both lower than
any results that have been recorded since 1989 (Doherty, 1). This widespread disapproval of
president-elect Trump suggests that, in contrast to many previous elections, Americans did
not come together even briefly to give their new leader a chance to prove himself. However,
it is unlikely that Russian interference directly accounts for this hesitance to embrace
president-elect Trump given that Russian disinformation focused on disparaging Hillary
Clinton while depicting Trump in a positive light.
The Pew Research data also suggests that American opinion has become increasingly
polarized with regard to Russia. In a January 2017 poll, 67% of Democrats and 41% of

51

Republicans agreed with a statement that “Russia’s ‘power and influence’ is a major
threat” (Doherty, 2). On the other hand, a survey conducted in April 2016 found that only
37% of Democrats, but 46% of Republicans, agreed that “tensions with Russia” posed a
major threat (Doherty, 2). There was also a wide partisan divide on the question of whether
Russia was behind the cyberattacks on the Clinton Campaign and the DNC: 93% of
Democrats thought that it probably or certainly was, in contrast with only 48% of
Republicans (Kiley, 1). This provides evidence that the very occurrence of Russian election
interference in the United States has helped drive a wedge between Americans of different
party affiliations. Thus, intensification of American political divisions is coded as 2 (high)
due to widespread controversy over the role Russia played in the election and acrimonious
debate regarding how to respond.
Some evidence also suggests that racial divisions in the United States became more
pronounced as a result of the 2016 election. A study conducted by Pew Research center found
that, in November of 2016, nearly 75% of Americans expected Trump’s election to make race
relations worse (Pew Research, 1). The same research found that American’s view of race
relations became slightly more negative, with 56% of respondents in 2017 describing them as
“generally bad” (Pew Research, 2). The intensification of racial divisions in the United States
is coded as 1 (moderate). Although things did get somewhat worse during the election cycle,
the divisions that arose were far from unprecedented. Moreover, the extent to which Russian
efforts to exacerbate racial animosity actually affected race relations is unclear. Finally, there
is no evidence to suggest that support for political extremism in the United States increased
significantly in the immediate aftermath of the 2016 election. Although Donald Trump’s later
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actions as president may have promoted extremist politics, this result cannot be directly
attributed to Russian election interference. Some observers have claimed that the emergence
of the fringe QAnon conspiracy theory in 2017 was encouraged in part by Russian
information warfare (Menn, 1), but this effort seems to have been distinct from Russian
election interference in 2016. Thus, the intensification of American political extremism is
coded as 0. Overall, the intensification of America’s internal divisions is a 3 out of 6,
suggesting a moderate in increase in these fractures.

Election Outcome
Donald Trump shocked much of the world when he claimed an unexpected victory on
November 8th. Although Clinton received approximately 2 million more votes than her
opponent, Trump won the electoral college by 306 votes to 232 (Blair, 335). Turnout was
quite low, with only 53.7% of eligible voters participating (Blair, 335). The election was also
among the most divisive in American history, with both candidates inspiring widespread
revulsion from the opposite side of the aisle through the campaign (Blair, 336). Allegations
of Russian interference soon came to light in the aftermath of the election, leading President
Obama to impose fresh sanctions on Russia in the waning days of his administration
(Johnson).

Dependent Variable: American Foreign Policy
Assessing American policy changes towards Russia in the wake of the 2016 election
is a complicated endeavor. Although some of President Trump’s actions and rhetoric seemed
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to be favorable to Russian interests, there were also prominent cases in which his
administration adopted a hawkish policy towards Russia. It is important to keep in mind that
Trump’s foreign policy was prone to rapid changes in disposition and a wide disparity
between rhetoric and real-world actions. Overall, policy changes with respect to Russia were
mixed but slightly unfavorable, and will be coded as -1 on a scale of -6 to 6. On one hand,
new sanctions against Russia were implemented and old ones were maintained, leading to a
moderate intensification of an unfavorable policy. Thus, changes in economic policy are
coded as -1. The Trump Administration also shifted to a significantly more confrontational
military posture towards Russia, so this aspect of foreign policy is coded as -2. However, the
United States’ diplomatic posture under President Trump was very favorable to Russia given
that it undermined NATO and reduced America’s prestige and involvement in global politics.
As such, this metric is coded as 2.
Many of Trump’s actions as president suggest a more confrontational military posture
towards Russia. Perhaps most notably, the Nuclear Posture Review released by his
administration advocated for the modernization of American nuclear forces and explicitly
considered the implications of renewed great power rivalries with Russia and China
(Cimbala, 111). It also suggested that a more flexible nuclear strategy, incorporating variableyield warheads and a wide range of tactical delivery systems, was needed to deter potential
adversaries (Cimbala, 110). This posture was likely interpreted by Russia as an aggressive
policy that lowered the threshold for nuclear warfare and moved the world towards a
dangerous arms race. President Trump also questioned the value of arms control agreements
and claimed that “the United States has fallen behind on nuclear weapon capacity” (Rutland,
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52). Some concrete actions, such as a move to withdraw from the Intermediate Nuclear Force
Treaty, suggested that this was more than mere bluster (Sperling and Webber, 512). Thus,
American nuclear policy under Trump seems to have become somewhat more assertive with
respect to Russia.
America’s conventional military posture also became somewhat more
confrontational. Key high level appointees, such as Secretary of Defense James Mattis,
National Security Advisors HR McMaster and John Bolton, and Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo were widely seen as national security hawks (Sperling and Weber, 514). Moreover,
Trump raised military spending with a 54 billion dollar increase in the national defense
budget (Rutland, 52). He also intensified American support for eastern European allies with a
2.5 billion dollar increase in funding for European Deterrence Initiative over his first 2 years
in office (Sperling and Webber, 524). The United States also forcefully opposed Russian
activity in Syria, launching a missile strike against the Assad regime in April of 2017 in
retaliation for its alleged use of chemical weapons (United States 2018, 2). In a separate
incident, American forces clashed with Russian mercenaries and are thought to have inflicted
a large number of casualties (United States 2018, 2). Thus, the early years of Trump’s
presidency saw the implementation of a more hawkish national security policy towards
Russia in both the nuclear and conventional domains. Overall, changes in American military
posture are coded as -2, or highly unfavorable to Russia.
The United States also continued to impose sanctions on Russia, with a particular
focus on Putin and his close associates. Congress passed the Countering America’s
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, which levied new sanctions against Russia, with almost
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unanimous approval (United States 2018, 5). By signing this bill into law, President Trump
assented to a notable increase in American sanctions against Russia. Thus American
economic policy changes with with respect to Russia are coded as -1, or somewhat
unfavorable.
However, other changes in America’s foreign policy posture were likely welcomed by
the Kremlin. Perhaps most importantly, Trump embraced a more transactional and
isolationist view of international relations (Macdonald, 410). In pursuit of an “America First”
policy, he moved quickly to withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord and rejected the Trans
Pacific Partnership trade agreement that his predecessor had worked to create (Sperling and
Webber, 512). He also frequently expressed a belief that traditional US allies were taking
advantage of American support to gain an economic advantage, leading some to question his
commitment to upholding the existing international order (Macdonald, 409). Moreover,
President Trump’s belligerent rhetoric towards allies and seeming affinity for autocrats such
as Rodrigo Duterte, Vladimir Putin, and Xi Jinping may have played into Russia’s hands.
The Trump administration also cast doubt on America’s commitment to NATO.
Trump was often a vocal critique of the alliance, calling it “obsolete” and complaining that it
was ill suited to combating terrorism (Macdonald, 411). He also frequently complained that
other members of the organization were taking advantage of the United States by failing to
pay their fair share for the defense of Europe (Sperling and Webber, 522). At a meeting of
NATO leaders in 2017, Trump refused to endorse the Article Five collective defense
commitment that requires all NATO members to come to the aid of an ally that has been
attacked (Sperling and Weber, 523). Overall, Trump’s criticism of longtime allies, withdrawal
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from global engagement, and skepticism of America’s relationships with its allies likely
damaged the international standing of the United States and gave Russia more room to
maneuver in global politics. As a leader who has long objected to American hegemony and
the liberal international order more generally, Putin was surely glad to see the United States
withdraw from a global leadership role. Thus, changes in U.S. diplomatic alignment are
coded as 2 (favorable to Russia).
The overall shift in American Russia policy in the aftermath of the 2016 election is
coded as -1 out of 6, suggesting a mixed but slightly more hawkish approach. Although
Trump’s policies undermined U.S. alliances and isolated the country from the world, they did
not usher in the drastic changes that some observers anticipated. The United States generally
remained committed to defending its allies despite some rhetoric to the contrary, and its
military stance actually became more hawkish due to an increase in defense spending and a
nuclear posture geared towards great power competition with Russia and China. Moreover,
the United States intensified sanctions against Russia and increased support for eastern
European allies. Thus, policy changes under Trump were decidedly mixed and cannot be
easily summed up as entirely positive or negative.

Conclusion
Overall, Russian interference in the 2016 election was intense and multifaceted.
Russian information warfare and cyberattacks both attempted to exacerbate American
political divisions while undermining Hillary Clinton and promoting Donald Trump. Tens if
not hundreds of millions of Americans were likely impacted in some way by Russian election
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interference. However, it must be noted that domestic sources of misinformation were
probably even more pervasive. Although it is difficult to say to what extent Russia
contributed to Trump’s victory, this study did find that foreign interference was somewhat
successful in intensifying America’s political and racial divides. This does not seem to have
led to major foreign policy concessions to Russia. Moscow likely benefited from American
withdrawal from global engagement and from the Trump Administration’s skepticism
towards alliances, international organizations, and trade. However, Trump’s presidency also
saw increased sanctions against Russia and a more assertive American military posture with
respect to nuclear policy, defense spending, and involvement in proxy wars such as the
Syrian conflict. Thus, Russian interference seems to have been at best ambiguously
successful in terms of securing foreign policy concessions.
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Chapter 4
The Taiwanese 2018 Local Elections

In 2018, local elections across Taiwan were subjected to a foreign interference
campaign that many claimed was unprecedented in scope and intensity. Two parties with
radically different visions for the future of Taiwan contended for influence: the Kuomintang
(KMT), which favors closer integration with the People’s Republic of China, and Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP), which promotes the development of a Taiwanese identity and the
preservation of de-facto independence. The Chinese government has long sought to unify
Taiwan with the mainland and views the DPP as a threat to its geopolitical interests. Seeking
to undermine the DPP, the Chinese government encouraged the spread of misinformation on
social media and traditional news platforms while simultaneously applying diplomatic and
political pressure to weaken Taiwanese resistance to unification. This case study will outline
the broader political context of China’s confrontation with Taiwan, detail China’s
interference in the 2018 election, and evaluate the impact of this interference on Taiwan’s
foreign policy and internal political divisions.

Background: Geopolitical Context
The current tensions between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan can be
traced to the Chinese Civil War, which began in 1927 and continued sporadically until 1949.
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This conflict pitted the Nationalist Republic of China (ROC) against the Communist People’s
Republic of China (PRC). Following the victory of Communist forces, the Nationalist
leadership fled to Taiwan and established a government in exile. Despite its limited power,
this government claimed to represent the entirety of China (Dittmer, 1). On the other hand,
the PRC asserted that it was the sole legitimate government of both mainland China and
Taiwan. Incorporating the island into the PRC quickly became a key foreign policy objective
of Chinese leaders (Lin and Zhou).
The United States has played a key role in preventing this outcome. Although
American policymakers seriously considered abandoning Taiwan in the early 1950s, the
Korean War convinced President Truman of the need to maintain a bastion against
Communist influence in the region (Lin and Zhou, 179). Over the next few decades Taiwan
received billions of dollars of American assistance and was afforded military protection
through the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty (Lin and Zhou, 179). Even when President Nixon
rescinded American recognition of Taiwan in favor of normalizing relations with China in
1971, the United States continued to insist that any reunification be accomplished peacefully
(Lin and Zhou, 180).
Since 1979, China has adhered to a policy of “peaceful reunification” based on the
assumption that its increasing economic clout and diplomatic influence would entice Taiwan
to rejoin the mainland (Gries and Wang, 43). The PRC has attempted to enhance its appeal
through the promotion of cultural exchange, cross-strait trade, and travel between the Taiwan
and the mainland (Dittmer, 2). Some policies, such as a 2005 reduction of tariffs on
Taiwanese agricultural produces, were specifically calculated to reward engagement with
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China and demonstrate the value of closer economic integration (Wong and Wu, 356).
Despite these efforts, recent events have called into question the assumption that time is on
the PRC’s side. Perhaps most importantly, the percentage of Taiwanese residents who
consider themselves Taiwanese rather than Chinese has been increasing steadily since the
1990s (Dittmer, 3). The election of anti-unification President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016 put this
trend in sharp relief and encouraged China to reevaluate its policy (Templeman, 87). The rise
of Xi Jinping, whose legitimacy is in large part based on a narrative of China’s ascendancy as
a great power, has also driven the intensification of Chinese efforts to retake Taiwan. In short,
the continued failure of peaceful incentives to bring about reunification, the restiveness of
Chinese nationalists, and President Xi Jinping’s desire to secure his legacy have led China to
implement more coercive measures (Gries and Wang, 46).
In recent years, China has ramped up the pressure on Taiwan both diplomatically and
militarily. It has successfully persuaded five countries to renounce their recognition of
Taiwan since 2016, leaving only fifteen that maintain official diplomatic relations with the
island (Gries and Wang, 42). China has also sought to isolate Taiwan by preventing it from
participating in international bodies such as the World Health Organization (Gries and Wang,
42). These efforts have been accompanied, in part, by increased military posturing from
Beijing. In 2016 and 2017 Chinese aircraft and naval units circumnavigated Taiwan in an
unprecedented show of force (Gries and Wang, 45). Tensions were further increased in 2019
when Taiwanese airspace was violated by PRC fighter jets (Templeman, 87). President Xi
Jinping has also implicitly threatened military action by warning that China will not “forsake
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the use of force” (Gries and Wang, 41). Thus, Chinese behavior following the election of Tsai
Ing-wen appears calibrated to increase the pressure on Taiwan to seek reunification.
There are currently two main political factions in Taiwan: the “pan-green” coalition
led by the China-skeptic Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the “pan-blue” coalition
led by the more conciliatory Kuomintang (KMT). The competition between these parties
predates the establishment of democracy and remains highly contentious (Templeman, 89).
The conservative KMT is a direct descendant of the nationalist government defeated in the
Chinese Civil War, whereas the DPP can trace its origins to the opposition groups that
agitated for political liberalization (Hsu et. al, 303). The DPP has officially favored
independence since 1991, when Taiwan’s first free multiparty elections were held. (Hsu et. al,
303). Although the KMT once advocated for independence, it has shifted to a pro-unification
stance since its defeat in the 2000 elections (Hok-wui Wong and Wu, 355). Today, these
differences of opinion regarding cross-strait relations with China are considered defining
characteristics of Taiwanese political factions (Hsu et. al, 301). Consequently, the Chinese
Communist Party has strong incentives to promote the KMT in order to achieve its goal of
reunification.

Independent Variable: Chinese Interference in the 2018 Elections
The 2018 Taiwanese local elections marked an important inflection point in crossstrait relations. Although President Tsai Ing-wen was not on the ballot, these elections were
widely considered to be an important indicator of her administration’s future prospects
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(Wang, 68). The stakes were also high for China. Because Tsai’s victory in 2016 had put the
China-skeptic DPP in power, many mainland observers felt that a KMT win was necessary to
keep their hopes of reunification alive (Gries and Wang, 42).
A widespread consensus has emerged that the 2018 election cycle was targeted by
extensive Chinese election interference that attempted to undermine the credibility of the
DPP. The intensity of this effort was high and coded as 4 on a scale from 0 to 6. Chinese
disinformation was very prevalent online and some of the more successful false narratives
were still widely believed on election day. As a result, the intensity of information warfare on
social media platforms is coded as high (2). China also seems to have been quite successful
at promoting its narrative through collusion with Taiwanese media outlets. Thus, the intensity
of Chinese information warfare through tradition media sources is also coded as high (2).
However, the PRC does not seem to have carried out any significant cyberattacks, so the
intensity of cyber warfare is coded as low (0).
Evidence of China-sponsored information warfare has been provided in part by the
Global Taiwan Institute, which found that false social media posts accusing Tsai Ing-wen’s
government of incompetence or malfeasance often originated in mainland China
(Templeman, 89). Most notably, a story alleging that Tsai had toured regions damaged by
flooding in an armored vehicle while being escorted by armed soldiers reached almost 85%
of the Taiwanese electorate (Wang, 78). Although there was no truth to this claim, it was still
believed by a significant portion of voters on election day. Moreover, its apparent credibility
was boosted by doctored images and captions that were widely disseminated by mainland
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social media accounts, which suggests that a concerted disinformation campaign was
underway (Templeman, 89).
Indeed, Taiwanese investigators found substantial evidence of Chinese efforts to
cultivate misleading narratives and incite hysteria. The Ministry of Justice Investigation
Bureau reported that sensationalist stories alleging that China planned to retake Taiwan by
force in 2020 were being systematically spread by CCP-sponsored “online content
farms” (Wang, 68). Moreover, exaggerated accounts of live-fire exercises carried out by the
People’s Liberation Army were also disseminated in order to support this narrative and incite
fear of an invasion should the DPP remain in power (Wang, 68). The New York Times and the
BBC concurred with the Bureau’s findings, reporting that a “Russian-style influence
campaign” was being deployed against Taiwan (Wang, 68).
Traditional media outlets also played a role in China’s disinformation campaign. The
China Times Group, owned by the pro-unification Taiwanese billionaire Tsai Engmeng,
unfailingly portrayed China in a favorable light throughout the election cycle (Templeman,
88). The affiliated China Times newspaper, one of Taiwan’s oldest publications, offered
detailed coverage of DPP infighting while failing to mention the anniversary of the
Tiananmen Square massacre or, later, the 2019 protests in Hong Kong (Templeman, 88). It
has also been reported that editors at the China Times were in regular contact with the
Chinese government, and that China secretly paid to place pro-mainland stories in various
Taiwanese papers (Templeman, 89). Thus, it seems clear that the PRC’s disinformation
campaign had a significant impact on traditional media outlets as well as more decentralized
online forums.
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The Chinese Communist Party complemented its efforts to undermine the DPP with
support for various KMT candidates. The most notable beneficiary of this foreign
intervention was Han Kuo-yu, a KMT mayoral candidate in the DPP stronghold Kaohsiung
(Templeman, 90). Although Han was considered an unlikely candidate, his focus on
economic issues and unconventional populist rhetoric propelled him to national prominence
(Templeman, 90). However, his success may also have been facilitated by sympathetic
coverage by pro-China media. More than half of China Times Group election coverage was
focused on Han’s candidacy, and significant numbers of mainland-based online groups also
supported his campaign (Templeman, 90). Thanks in part to this enthusiastic foreign backing,
Han became the KMT’s most well-known candidate and enjoyed universal name recognition
in Taiwan (Templeman, 90). On election day, Han pulled off a stunning upset victory, wining
54 percent of the vote in a perennial DPP stronghold (Templeman, 90).
In short, Chinese disinformation appears to have been quite successful in the 2018
elections. Some of the most prolific false stories promoted by the PRC reached more than 70
percent of the electorate (Wang, 80). Moreover, only about half of Taiwanese voters were
capable of identifying the correct version of events even in well-publicized cases of
disinformation (Wang, 80). Factchecking organizations were generally obscure, with clear
majorities of Taiwanese voters lacking awareness of their existence (Wang, 81). Due to the
pervasiveness of Chinese disinformation on social media, the intensity of information
warfare online is coded as high (2). The intensity of information warfare through traditional
media is also coded as high (2) due to the collusion of some of Taiwan’s most influential
news outlets with the Chinese government. Lastly, the intensity of cyber warfare against
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Taiwan is coded as low (0) due to the lack of any well-publicized cyberattacks against
Taiwanese election infrastructure. Overall, the level of hybridized election interference in this
case was high and is coded as 4 out of a possible 6.

Intervening Variable: Taiwanese Internal Divisions
It is hard to definitively determine the extent to which Chinese interference worsened
internal divisions in Taiwanese society. Although Taiwan is widely considered to be a wellconsolidated democracy, high levels of political polarization have been common for much of
its recent history (Lee, 35). Moreover, partisan affiliation is closely associated with national
identity: citizens who see themselves as Taiwanese tend to support the DPP, whereas those
who consider themselves Chinese or both Chinese and Taiwanese generally prefer the KMT
(Lee, 36). Despite these fault lines, Taiwanese voters on both sides tend to favor moderation
regarding relations with China and are wary of dramatic changes to the status quo (Lee, 37).
The overall intensification of Taiwan’s internal divisions was fairly low and was
coded as 2 out of 6. The island’s political divisions were significantly worsened due to
controversy regarding the DPP’s response to election interference. Even the question of
whether interference occurred was the subject of bitter debate. As a result, the intensification
of Taiwanese political divisions was coded as high (2 out of 2). However, there was no
evidence to suggest increases in political extremism or racial tension, so both of these metrics
were coded as low (0).
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It seems clear that the topic of Chinese election interfere was quite controversial
following the 2018 election. Despite the occurrence of an intense disinformation campaign,
only 48% of Taiwanese voters believed that interference took place. The remainder were
either unsure or were convinced that there was no interference (Wang, 81). Some KMT
commentators believed that the DPP exaggerated the threat posed by China in order to
improve its political prospects (Hille, 2). Critics also charged that the DPP was using claims
of Chinese influence to push through potentially repressive legislation. The KMT was
particularly outraged by an “anti-infiltration” law designed to combat future election
meddling and even claimed that it increased the risk of renewed military rule (Hille, 2). Thus,
Chinese election interference seems to have significantly increased Taiwan’s political
divisions. However, there was no evidence that the PRC’s campaign led to an intensification
of political extremism or racial tensions.
It is also important to note that the promotion of internal divisions does not seem to
have been a major objective of Chinese interference in the 2018 elections. Instead, China’s
actions should be understood primarily as an effort to install a more friendly government in
Taiwan by undermining the DPP while promoting KMT candidates. This interpretation is
supported by the pro-China media’s glowing coverage of Han Kuo-yu, which makes sense in
the context of promoting a specific candidate but would be difficult to explain if China’s goal
was simply to sow discord and cynicism. Although Chinese disinformation often attempted
to instill fear and paranoia, it accomplished this not by setting the Taiwanese people against
each other, but by portraying the DPP as a reckless, radical, and inept organization bent on
pursing its agenda regardless of the cost to its constituents.
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The degree to which China exacerbated Taiwan’s internal divisions is coded as 2 on a
scale from 0 to 6 due to significant political controversy regarding the DPP’s response to
Chinese information warfare. However, the value for this variable remains low given the lack
of evidence that Chinese interference caused any additional divisions.

Election Outcome
The Democratic Progressive Party suffered a major defeat in the 2018 election,
retaining control of only 6 local offices out of the 22 that were contested (Chung-Min, 78).
Tsai Ing-wen’s approval rating at the time of the election was below 20% and the DPP overall
received only 39% of the vote (Chung-Min, 78). However, due to the fact that these elections
were strictly local in nature, Tsai Ing-wen remained in power and her party retained control
of the national legislature. This allowed the DPP to formulate a robust response to Chinese
interference.

Dependent Variable: Taiwanese Post-Election Policy
Chinese success in promoting local KMT candidates failed to bring about foreign
policy concessions to the mainland regime. Because only local offices were contested in the
2018 election cycle, the DPP retained control over both the presidency and the legislature
(Templeman, 94). As a result, Taiwan’s foreign policy became significantly more hawkish
towards China. This change was coded as -3 on a scale from -6 to 6. Changes in the island’s
diplomatic posture were highly unfavorable to China, with Tsai Ing-wen forcefully rejecting
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the prospect of reunification under a “one country, two systems” framework. Thus, this
metric was coded as -2. Changes in Taiwan’s economic policy towards China were also
somewhat unfavorable and are coded as -1. Finally, no major changes occurred in Taiwan’s
military posture, so this metic is coded as 0.
Following the 2018 elections, the pan-green coalition implemented several policy
changes intended to curb illicit Chinese influence. In an effort to increase transparency, the
DPP used its legislative majority to require that all registered political parties issue annual
finical statements (Templeman, 94). More dramatically, the DPP was also able to push
through a new “anti-infiltration” law that made it a criminal offense to influence elections on
behalf of “overseas hostile forces” (Hille, 1). Residents of Taiwan were prohibited from
accepting money from such actors or from acting according to their instructions (Bailey,
227). The law also curtailed foreign lobbying and political donations (Bailey, 227). The DPP
argued that this legislation was necessary in light of China’s efforts to subvert Taiwanese
democracy and its apparent willingness to forcibly annex the island (Hille, 1). However, the
anti-infiltration law was nevertheless divisive, with the KMT warning that it would give the
government unchecked powers, pose a threat to innocent people, and even risk a return to
martial law (Hille, 2). The Taiwanese bureaucracy also increased its scrutiny of people and
organizations linked to the PRC. Government procurement of Chinese communications
technology was halted, fines for falsifying documents to illicitly import Chinese products
were increased, and Taiwanese citizens who held PRC residence cards were barred from
running for public office (Templeman, 95).
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In addition to these efforts to curb Chinese influence, Tsai Ing-wen also doubled
down on her pro-independence foreign policy in 2019 when she pointedly rejected the 1992
consensus in a public statement (Lai, 178). In the same statement, Ing-wen explicitly rejected
the “one country, two systems” framework that China proposes as a model for unification
(Bailey, 226). Her position on this issue seems to align with Taiwanese public opinion.
Indeed, rejection of “one country, two systems” is nearly universal, with several polls
showing that as many as 90% of Taiwanese oppose such an arrangement (Bailery, 226).
Overall, it appears that Taiwanese policy towards China became more hawkish
despite the seemingly successful interference campaign conducted by the PRC. Changes in
Taiwan’s diplomatic posture towards China are coded as -2, or highly unfavorable due to Tsai
Ing-wen’s forceful rejection of reunification on China’s terms. The implementation of a
robust anti-infiltration law that cracked down on avenues of Chinese influence and limited
some forms of interactions between Taiwan and the mainland contributes to this coding.
Changes in Taiwan’s economic policy were also somewhat unfavorable to China. The island
took steps to limit imports of Chinese goods and cut back on purchases of communications
technology from the mainland. This withdrawal from economic interaction is coded as -1.
Finally, Taiwan’s military posture presents a mixed picture. Although president Tsai Ing-wen
promised to improve military readiness in January 2020, no major changes have been
implemented and many observers consider Taiwan to be unprepared for conflict (Gries and
Wang, 49). Therefore, Taiwan’s military posture is coded as 0 (no change). Overall,
Taiwanese foreign policy changes are coded as a -3 on a scale ranging from -6 to 6. This
suggests a moderately more assertive foreign policy towards China.
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Conclusion
Overall, it seems clear that China conducted an intense and far-reaching intervention
campaign in Taiwan’s 2018 local elections. Information warfare, conducted through
traditional TV and news outlets as well as social media “content farms”, was a key
component of this effort. Although the PRC’s election interference seems to have
successfully promoted KMT candidates, it appears have had a fairly limited effect on
Taiwan’s internal divisions. It is probable that intensifying these divisions was only a
secondary objective for China. Moreover, Chinese election interference clearly failed to
extract any foreign policy concessions from Taiwan. Thus, although China’s preferred
political faction did well in this case, the CCP’s ultimate goal of unification may not be any
closer.
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Chapter 5
The United Kingdom 2016 EU Membership Referendum

On June 23, 2016, a narrow majority of United Kingdom citizens voted to withdraw
their country from the European Union (Goodwin and Heath, 323). This outcome stunned
many observers and catalyzed sweeping changes in Britain’s economic and political
relationship with Europe (Campello, 1). However, critics have charged that the ‘Brexit’ vote
might not accurately reflect the public will, alleging that foreign actors attempted to influence
the referendum. In 2019, the House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport
Committee concluded that Russia engaged in “unconventional warfare” against the UK
during the campaign (McGaughey, 334). This case study will explore the political context in
which the Brexit Referendum took place and examine the extent to which Russian
interference played a role in the outcome. It will then analyze changes in the UK’s internal
divisions throughout the campaign. Finally, changes in Britain’s foreign policy following the
referendum will be evaluated.

Background: Political Context
The United Kingdom first joined what would eventually become the European Union
in 1973 (Wall, 3). A referendum held in 1975 confirmed this decision, with 67% of voters
supporting continued membership (Goodwin and Heath, 1). However, the UK was frequently
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a reluctant member of the European community. Many of its citizens expressed concern that
European institutions could limit the sovereignty of the British government and thus opposed
closer integration (Adam, 20). The United Kingdom’s reluctance to tie itself too closely to
the rest of Europe was highlighted by its decisions to remain outside the Schengen free
movement zone and to retain the pound rather than adopt the Euro (Zyla, 58). Moreover,
British policymakers often tended to favor relations with the United States over relations
with Europe (Zyla, 60).
In the first two decades of the 21st century several events led an increasing number of
British citizens to become disillusioned with the European Union. The 2008 financial crisis
had a serious impact on the stability of the Euro, reinforcing the conviction of many UK
voters that their county needed to maintain an independent fiscal policy (Adam, 40). In 2015,
the EU struggled to find a solution to the dramatic influx of refugees from the Middle East
and North Africa (Zyla, 67). These factors, combined with an increasing belief among
conservatives that the EU was undemocratic and economically uncompetitive, helped fuel the
rapid rise of Euro-skepticism (Adam, 39). The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
provided the most dramatic illustration of this trend, winning more representatives to the EU
parliament than any other UK-based party in 2014 (Campello, 6). Though the party was
created in 1993, its popularity began to rapidly increase starting around 2010 (Clarke,
Goodwin, and Whiteley, 118). By 2015, it was a major political force (Clarke, Goodwin, and
Whiteley, 118).
The 2016 referendum was initially proposed in 2013 by Conservative Prime Minister
David Cameron, who promised as part of a campaign strategy that Britain would hold a
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referendum on EU membership should his party win the 2015 general elections (Campello,
6). Although Cameron opposed leaving the EU outright, he believed that he could renegotiate
the terms of the UK’s participation and achieve a better deal while retaining the benefits of
EU membership (Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley, 2). Specifically, he sought to ensure fair
terms of trade between Britain and the Eurozone countries, bolster the EU’s competitiveness
by cutting costs for businesses, exempt Britain from closer integration with other EU
members, and impose limits on migration into the UK (Wall, 282). He also hoped that the
referendum would undermine support for the UKIP, which posed an increasing political
threat (Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley, 8). However, it appears that in some cases Cameron’s
expressions of discontent with the EU merely strengthened the UKIP’s argument that Britain
should leave the union (Wall, 282).

Russia and the European Union
Relations between Russia and the European Union have often been characterized by
competition and misunderstanding in recent years. Following the collapse of the USSR,
many policymakers in the EU and the United States assumed that Russia would liberalize and
move towards closer relations with the west (Ornstein, 11). However, since 2007 Russian
president Vladimir Putin has adopted a more confrontational stance (Ornstein, 14). He
became an increasingly harsh critic of the western-led liberal world order and decried the fall
of the Soviet Union as “the major geopolitical disaster of the [20th] century” (Kanet, 14).
Since the mid 2000s, Russia has sought to mitigate the effects of this “disaster" by
establishing a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe (Nitoiu, 150). As a result, it has become
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increasingly resentful of the EU’s attempts to expand into former soviet states and promote
democratization in Eastern Europe (Kanet, 15).
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a key turning point in its relationship with
the EU (Casier, 1). Prior to the invasion, Ukraine had seemingly been on track to sign an
exclusive Association Agreement with the EU, which would have been a key step towards
membership in the union (Kanet, 20). Thus, Russia’s military actions were interpreted as an
attempt to prevent an expansion of EU influence as well as a violation of international norms.
Relations between the European Union and Russia quickly declined to a level not seen since
the Cold War. (Casier, 1). The United Kingdom, one of the strongest advocates for a robust
response, called for the expulsion of Russia from the G8 and a boycott of the Sochi Olympics
(Johnson, 42). The EU also imposed a wide range of sanctions on Russia, which were soon
met with Russian counter-sanctions against European food imports (Kanet, 20). Overall, the
relationship between Russia and the EU was characterized by intense competition at the time
of the Brexit referendum, and Moscow had strong incentives to weaken the EU’s political
cohesion if it could find a way to do so.

Independent Variable: Russian Election Interference
The extent to which Russia intervened in the 2016 Brexit referendum is a matter of
some controversy. Though it seems clear that Russian state-controlled media outlets had
significant reach and were biased in favor of Brexit, it is harder to determine the intensity of
Russian social media-based disinformation in this case. This study codes the intensity of
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Russia’s information warfare on conventional media platforms as 1 (medium), whereas the
intensity of information warfare online is coded as 0 (low). The intensity of Russian
cyberattacks is coded as 0 (low) given that no such attacks are know to have been conducted
with political motivations. Thus, the overall level of Russian interference is coded as 1 out of
6.
There is significant evidence that Russia attempted to promote the Leave Campaign
through the use of state-controlled traditional media outlets. As a result, the intensity of
Russia’s conventional media disinformation is coded as 1 (medium). The two most
prominent state-controlled Russian news companies, Sputnik and RT, both displayed a clear
anti-EU bias in their reporting (House of Commons, 70). The DCMS report found that proLeave articles published by Sputnik and RT may have reached up to 130 million people
(House of Commons, 70). The main pro-Leave websites appear to have had a smaller
audience, with 44 million people viewing content from Vote Leave and Leave.EU
collectively (House of Commons, 70). A study by the Oxford Internet Institute also found
some evidence of Russian influence in the referendum, noting that approximately 0.6% of
tweets with Brexit hashtags linked to Russian sources (Kuchler and Ram, 1). Taken together,
this evidence suggests that Russian media was at least somewhat successful in influencing
the Brexit debate.
Social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook may also have been conduits of
Russian influence. Unfortunately, there is little hard evidence to definitively support or refute
claims of Russian disinformation campaigns on social media. A study conducted by the
Oxford Internet Institute found 105 Russian troll accounts that collectively tweeted around
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16,000 times prior to the election (Kuchler and Ram, 1). However, the researchers stressed
that this was an insignificant amount of activity compared to Russia’s well-documented
intervention in the 2016 US presidential election (Kuchler and Ram, 1). On the other hand,
research carried out at the University of Edinburgh suggests that Russian accounts involved
in the American election may have been repurposed to target the Brexit Referendum
(Llewellyn et. al, 1152). Out of 2,752 accounts identified by Twitter as participants in
Russia’s effort to undermine the 2016 presidential race, 419 appear to have posted Brexitrelated content in a cumulative 3,485 tweets (Llewellyn et. at, 1148). Moreover, these
accounts were observed to intensify their activity on the day of the referendum, which
suggests a calculated effort to influence the vote (Llewellyn et. al, 1153). However, it is
important to note that the number of tweets identified by this study is minuscule in
comparison to the overall volume of online discourse regarding Brexit. Although it is
possible that additional Russian activity escaped observation, it seems that interfering in the
Brexit referendum was a low priority for Russia. Thus, the intensity of Russian
disinformation on social media is coded as 0 (low) despite the irrefutable existence of some
such disinformation.
There have also been allegations that Russia worked with the wealthy British
entrepreneur Arron Banks to illicitly contribute money to the Leave Campaign (Wright, 1).
According to the DCMS Report, Banks’ is thought to have donated approximately 8.4
million pounds to Leave.EU (House of Commons, 74). This is believed to be the largest
contribution to a political campaign in British history (House of Commons, 74). The
Electoral Commission, which serves as an election watchdog in the UK, claimed that it had
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“reasonable grounds to suspect” that Banks was “not the true source” of these funds (Wright,
2). Banks is known to have meet with Russian Embassy staff in London on several
occasions, raising the possibility that he may have colluded with the Kremlin to bankroll the
Leave Campaign (House of Commons, 74).
Overall, it is difficult to ascertain the degree to which Russia intervened in the Brexit
campaign. The limited available sources suggest that Russian state-controlled media such as
RT and Sputnik deliberately supported Brexit and reached a significant audience. Thus,
Russian interference on traditional media platforms is coded as 1, suggesting a moderate
level of activity. While there is some evidence that Russia attempted to spread disinformation
on social media to some extent, there is no widespread consensus that this activity was
significant. Moreover, only a very small number of Russian accounts were discovered
attempting to influence the Brexit referendum. Although it is impossible to rule out a broader,
undiscovered, intervention, existing evidence suggests that the intensity of Russian social
media disinformation should be coded as 0 (low). Finally, there is no evidence of Russian
cyberattacks aimed at influencing the Brexit vote, so the intensity of Russian cyber warfare is
also coded as 0. Thus, the overall intensity of Russian election interference in this case is
coded as 1 out of 6, suggesting a low but non-negligible level of interference.

Intervening Variable: Internal Divisions
The 2016 Referendum resulted in a narrow but nevertheless shocking win for Leave,
with approximately 52% of voters opting to withdraw from the European Union (Goodwin
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and Heath, 323). Turnout was the highest it had been in decades, with over 72% of the
electorate casting a vote (Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley, 1). The surprising Leave victory
destroyed the political future of David Cameron, who resigned the office of Prime Minister
and was replaced by fellow conservative Theresa May (Campello, 55). The United
Kingdom’s new leader soon moved to withdraw from the European Union, which marked the
beginning of a complicated and contentious exit that would take years to unfold.
Internal divisions in the United Kingdom appear to have intensified during the Brexit
campaign. Because the referendum did not provide a clear outline of how Britain should
leave the EU, the issue of what kind of Brexit to pursue became a contentious question.
Moreover, the campaign appears to have intensified divisions within some of the main
political parties and contributed to increased anti-elite populism. As a result, the
intensification of political divisions seems to have been high and is coded as 2 out of 2.
However, there did not appear to be any increase in political extremism despite the fact that
more radial parties such as UKIP were the most enthusiastic supporters of Brexit. Increases
in racial animosity also seemed to be minimal. Thus the intensification of the United
Kingdom’s internal divisions is coded as 2 out of 6, suggesting a relatively low increase.
The Brexit referendum appears to have significantly intensified Britain’s political
divisions. Both the Conservative and Labor parties were divided on the issue of Brexit, with
demographic factors such as age, race, level of education, and geographic location becoming
better predictors of voting behavior than party identification (Goodwin and Heath). This
division persisted in the aftermath of the vote, with Theresa May struggling to maintain unity
between her party’s “hard Brexit” and pro-Remain factions (Adam, 128). She was often
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unsuccessful in this endeavor and her government had great difficulty in building a
parliamentary majority that would support any particular Brexit plan (Adam, 129). This
suggests that the referendum may have exacerbated some internal divisions by disrupting the
existing partisan alignment and ushering in a turbulent period of adjustment.
The vote to leave the European Union also seems to have reinforced a trend towards
divisive, anti-expert populism. Many voters seemed to be remarkably ill-informed and made
their decisions on the basis of emotions and “gut instinct” rather than any coherent
understanding of the choices presented to them. Indeed, on June 24th, the day after the
referendum, the most commonly searched question on Google in the UK was “what is the
EU” (Adam, 109). Pro-Leave politician Michael Gove summed up the prevailing sentiment
among many voters when he declared that “the people of this country have had enough of
experts” (Adam, 90). The outcome of the referendum seems to have vindicated this claim,
with a majority of voters opting for Brexit despite the fact that nearly 75% of the House of
Commons opposed the idea (Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley, 5). Indeed, only 148 members
of parliament out of a total of 650 voted to leave the European Union (Goodwin and Heath,
324). This put the United Kingdom’s legislature in the unusual position of having to
implement a policy which it opposed by an overwhelming margin.
In addition, Brexit significantly exacerbated political divisions between different parts
of the UK. Although the overall vote was very close, regions such as Scotland and Northern
Ireland voted decisively to remain (Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley, 150). In light of
Scotland’s previous consideration of independence from the UK in 2014, the triumph of a
policy which its voters opposed by a 24 point margin may encourage it to seek independence.
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The Scottish National Party’s announcement in 2016 that it would seek another independence
referendum suggests that Brexit may have undermined the political cohesion of the United
Kingdom. Northern Ireland presents an even more serious problem. The Good Friday
Agreements that brought an end to the conflict between Irish nationalists and unionists are
contingent upon having a minimally obtrusive border between Northern Ireland and the rest
of the island (Adam, 212). Brexit threatened to make this boundary an external border of the
EU, thus significantly worsening political divisions in the region.
In short, the Brexit referendum appears to have significantly intensified Britain’s
political divisions. It encouraged increased polarization within some of the main political
parties, fueled the rise of populism, and may risk creating divisions between difference
regions of the UK. As a result, the intensification of political divisions during the Brexit
campaign is coded as high (2 out of 2). However, neither racial tensions nor political
extremism appeared to increase as a result of Russian interference. Although the once-fringe
UKIP party did become more influential, this process was already well underway even before
the Brexit referendum. Moreover, the mainstream conservative party was able to remain in
power following Brexit, albeit under new leadership. Thus the intensification of Britain’s
internal divisions is coded as 2 out of 6, suggesting a relatively low but significant increase.

Dependent Variable: British Foreign Policy
The United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU marked a crucial inflection point in
the country’s role in the world. Proponents of Brexit contended that leaving the union would
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enable Britain to more freely pursue an independent and globally oriented foreign policy
(Oppermann, Beasley, and Kaarbo, 138). However, many others expressed concern that the
UK would find itself isolated economically and militarily while having a less influential
voice in European affairs. The potential effects of Brexit were equally unpredictable for the
European Union. The referendum marked the first time when the EU experienced a major
decline in size and economic power (Jacobs, 7). The United Kingdom’s withdrawal also
diminished the EU’s global influence, depriving the union of its most powerful military and
one of its largest economies (Zyla, 86). However, some optimists argued that the EU, no
longer held back by a perennially reluctant member, may be able to pursue closer integration
(Jacobs, 3).
Although the long term implications of Brexit remain a topic of active scholarly
debate, the immediate effects of the referendum appear to have been beneficial to Russia. By
leaving the European Union, the UK entered a new era of uncertainty and experienced a
decline in its political influence and economic prosperity. Thus, the changes in Britain’s
diplomatic alignment ushered in by Brexit were highly favorable to Russia, and are coded as
2 out of 2. However, the United Kingdom’s military posture remained largely the same
despite its withdrawal from the EU. As a result, changes in this aspect of foreign policy were
minimal and were coded as 0. Finally, the United Kingdom’s economic policy towards
Russia did not undergo any major changes as a result of Russian interference in the Brexit
referendum. Thus, the United Kingdom’s foreign policy changes are coded as somewhat
favorable to Russia (2 out of 6).
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The Brexit referendum catalyzed changes in the United Kingdom’s diplomatic
alignment that were highly favorable to Russia. Although a narrow majority of the British
people opted to leave the European Union, the 2016 vote did not provide any specific details
regarding how this should take place or what kind of relationship Britain should subsequently
seek with the EU (Adam, 130). This resulted in a considerable degree of chaos and
uncertainty as Theresa May’s government attempted to articulate a plan for Brexit. The issue
of the border between Northern Ireland (which is part of the United Kingdom) and the rest of
the island became especially problematic. This boundary had been kept open since 1973 in
order to limit conflict between Irish nationalists and British unionists (Adam, 142). However,
maintaining this arrangement after Britain left the EU proved to be a serious diplomatic
challenge (Adam, 142). The United Kingdom also gave up much of the significant influence
it once enjoyed as one of the EU’s largest and most powerful members (Jacob, 87). As a
result, Britain may risk being influenced by EU policies over which it has no control.
The economic impact of Brexit was also unfavorable to the UK. Prior to the
referendum, annual trade between Britain and the other 27 EU member states totaled 491
billion dollars and accounted for nearly 20% of the UK’s GDP (Stevović, 45). The critical
importance of this economic interaction put Prime Minister May’s government under a great
deal of pressure to secure favorable terms of trade with the EU. UK policymakers also hoped
to offset any economic losses incurred by Brexit by negotiating new trade deals. However,
efforts to accomplish this met with limited success as potential partners such as Japan were
quick to indicate that they prioritized their economic relations with the EU (Oppermann,
Beasley and Kaarbo, 139). British economic markets were also temporarily destabilized by
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Brexit, with notable indices of economic uncertainty spiking to 4 times their baseline values
in the immediate aftermath of the referendum (Campello, 6). To make matters worse, the
long term economic consequences of Brexit could be severe, particularly in crucial sectors,
such as finance, which rely heavily on access to European markets (Clarke, Goodwin, and
Whiteley, 176). Even non-EU trading partners such as the United States may reduce their
economic interactions with the UK given that it no longer offers such proximity to the
European market (Campello, 21). Although it is still too early to conclusively evaluate
Brexit’s economic impact, current projections suggest that it could cost the UK 1.5 to 4
percent of its GDP by 2030 (Stevović, 61). Thus, Brexit seems to have come at a significant
economic cost.
The United Kingdom’s military posture seems to have changed relatively little in the
aftermath of Brexit. At the time of the referendum, the United Kingdom possessed one of the
largest and most capable militaries in Europe and accounted for 25% of the EU’s total
defense spending (Zyla, 88). Although this led to some concerns that the EU would face a
shortfall in defense capabilities, the UK stated in 2017 that it remained unconditionally
committed to maintaining European security (Zyla, 85). The United Kingdom also remained
a key member of NATO, providing it with a framework to continue participating in military
collaboration with many other EU states (Johnson, 4). Thus, Britain’s military posture
remained mostly unchanged following the Brexit referendum.
The United Kingdom’s economic policy towards Russia also appears to have
remained constant following the Brexit referendum. No major changes in either trade or
sanctions took place as a result of Russian interference. Although the poisoning of former
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Russian spy Sergi Skripal on British soil in 2018 did lead to worsened relations between the
two countries, this was not attributable to Russian election interference and is thus outside
the purview of this study.
Overall, Brexit caused changes in the UK’s diplomatic alignment that were costly in
both political and economic terms. The county lost the significant influence it enjoyed in the
EU and gave up unrestricted access to its markets. This had substantial short term economic
impacts and may prove to be very costly in the future. Moreover, the UK has failed to extract
any meaningful benefits from the “independence” that many of its voters expected from
Brexit. Thus, the referendum significantly weakened the UK’s position, playing into the
hands of a Russian government that wishes to see the west divided. Changes in Britain’s
diplomatic posture were thus highly favorable to Russia and are coded as 2 out of 2. On the
other hand, changes in the United Kingdom’s military posture were very limited and the
county remained committed to defense cooperation with the EU. As a result, this metic is
coded as 0 (no change). British economic policy towards Russia also appears to have been
unaffected by Russian interference in the Brexit referendum. Thus, the United Kingdom’s
overall change in foreign policy towards Russia was somewhat favorable to Moscow’s
interests and is coded as 2 out of 6.

Conclusion
Overall, Russian interference seems to have encouraged a Leave victory in the 2016
Brexit referendum. Russia’s efforts to promote a pro-Brexit narrative through state-controlled
outlets such as RT and Sputnik appear to have been quite successful. Indeed, these sources
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likely reached more voters than the official Vote Leave website. Moreover, Russia may have
provided illicit finical support to pro-Brexit campaigners through the businessman Arron
Banks and others. There is substantial evidence that this Russian interference intensified the
United Kingdom’s internal divisions by helping to fuel the rise of divisive populist politics.
The referendum was also highly regionally polarized, with Scotland and Northern Ireland
overwhelmingly supporting Remain. Thus, the result of the Brexit referendum may have
weakened the UK’s territorial integrity in addition to increasing its political divisions. The
aftermath of the Brexit campaign saw Britain implement a foreign policy that generally
favored Russia. By withdrawing from the EU, the United Kingdom weakened its economic
prospects and lost the significant political influence that it had possessed as a member of the
union. In short, Russia’s interference in the Brexit referendum appears to have accomplished
its goals of weakening the UK and dividing the west despite its limited intensity.
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Chapter 6
Analysis and Conclusions

This Independent Study investigated the impact of hybridized election interference
campaigns on democratic societies. Drawing on existing hybrid warfare literature, it
identified election interference as a key instrument of hybrid aggression that is becoming
increasingly relevant as a result of new technological developments. The study evaluated two
main hypotheses: (1) hybridized election interference will lead to an intensification of
internal divisions within states that experience it, and (2) the intensification of these internal
divisions will make a state more likely to make foreign policy concessions to the intervener.
This chapter will describe the results of the study, evaluate both hypotheses, and discuss
some notable cross-case trends. It will then situate these findings in the existing literature and
propose some ideas for future research.

Overview of Results
This study investigated three cases where democratic states were subjected to election
interference in varying forms. The 2016 American presidential election and the 2018
Taiwanese local elections both experienced intense interference that featured a high level of
online information warfare. However, there were some qualitative differences between the
two cases, with cyberattacks complementing Russian information warfare in United States
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and traditional media outlets severing as important conduits of Chinese disinformation in
Taiwan. The level of election interference in both of these cases was coded as high (4 out of
6). I found that interference in the 2016 “Brexit” referendum seemed to be far less severe.
Russian meddling was mostly limited to information warfare through state-controlled media
outlets, and the intensity of election interference was coded as low (1 out of 6).
Each of the countries studied seemed to experience an intensification of its internal
divisions during and immediately after its election. The United States saw the largest
increase, which was coded as moderate (3 out of 6), and both Taiwan and the United
Kingdom experienced a lower increase (2 out of 6). However, the findings on foreign policy
concessions were less uniform. American policy changes were coded as slightly unfavorable
to Russia (-1) and Taiwanese changes were coded as moderately unfavorable to China (-3).
This suggests that both states became more hawkish, although the change in Taiwanese
foreign policy was much more pronounced. On the other hand, the United Kingdom’s policy
changes were coded as somewhat favorable to Russia (2).

Hypothesis 1: Election Interference and Internal Divisions
This study supports the hypothesis that hybridized election interference causes an
intensification of a state’s internal divisions. All three states that were examined in this study
seem to have experienced at least some increase in such divisions during and immediately
after their respective elections. However, there does not appear to be a strong correlation
between the intensity of election interference and the worsening of internal divisions in a
state. The United States and Taiwan, which were both coded as cases with high levels of
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interference (4 out of 6), both appear to have experienced moderate intensifications of their
internal divisions (3 out of 6 and 2 out of 6 respectively). However, internal divisions also
seem to have increased moderately in the United Kingdom (2 out of 6) despite the low
intensity of Russia election interference (1 out of 6). Thus, although it seems clear that
election interference exacerbates a country’s internal divisions, the extent to which this
occurs is not entirely dependent upon the intensity of the interference.
This reason for this seemingly weak correlation might be understood by examining
the differences between Chinese and Russian behavior. China’s intervention in Taiwan’s 2018
elections appears to have been motivated by a desire to promote the comparatively promainland KMT party. Much of the propaganda spread by China was intended to portray the
mainland and its favored candidates in a positive light rather than encourage cynicism and
disenchantment with politics (Templeman, 90). The glowing coverage given to KMT
candidates such as Han Kuo-yu would be difficult to explain if promoting discord was
Beijing’s primary goal. Although Chinese interference appears to have intensified Taiwan’s
internal divisions, this does not seem to have been a major goal of the PRC.
On the other hand, Russian interference in the United States clearly focused on
fueling division. The Senate Intelligence Committee Report details the efforts of Russian
operatives to create personas on both sides of contentious issues such as immigration and
race relations (United States, 34). On some occasions these “troll” accounts were even
observed to argue against one other. This behavior seems to make little sense as part of an
effort to promote a candidate but may be logical as part of a campaign to intensify political
divisions. Russia’s plans to delegitimize the results of the 2016 election in the event of a
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Clinton win further underscore Moscow’s interest in worsening America’s internal divisions.
Although it is more difficult to determine Russia’s specific goals in the United Kingdom, it
seems reasonable to imagine that its tactics were similar in both cases even if the intensity of
its efforts differed. Thus, the seemingly disproportionate effect of Russian election
interference on internal divisions may be explained by Russia’s focused attempts to promote
them.

Hypothesis 2: Internal Divisions and Foreign Policy Changes
The hypothesis that internal divisions will cripple a state’s ability to conduct an
assertive foreign policy was not supported. Indeed, both countries that experienced intense
election interference adopted a more assertive policy towards the intervener despite their
internal political troubles. This shift was the most evident in Taiwan, which initiated a
crackdown on Chinese influence and moved to distance itself from the “1992 consensus”
touted by mainland China as a framework for reunification. Taiwanese foreign policy
changes were thus coded as -3, suggesting a moderately more assertive foreign policy. This is
not particularly surprising given that president Tsai Ing-wen, whose party was a target of
Chinese interference, remained in power after the 2018 election. However, concessions to an
intervener are not guaranteed even its preferred candidate wins. Although Donald Trump
undoubtably benefited from Russian interference in America’s 2016 presidential election, the
policies that he enacted were in many respects more hawkish towards Moscow than those of
his predecessor and were coded as -1.
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A variety of factors could explain why intensified internal divisions do not seem to
prevent states from implementing assertive foreign policies. One possibility is that, even in
democracies, the will of the people is rarely reflected in foreign policy decisions. In many
cases, matters of diplomacy are simply a low priority for the majority of voters, who are
more concerned with domestic policy debates or hot-button “culture war” issues. As a result,
foreign policy decisions can be made by career bureaucrats who are less influenced by dayto-day political controversies. The activities of Russia’s Internet Research Agency appear to
reflect an awareness that inflammatory rhetoric regarding race, immigration, or religion
attracts far more attention than a discussion of the United States’ approach to foreign policy.
Thus, internal divisions might have a serious impact on a state’s ability to implement
domestic policy without impeding the ordinary course of foreign policy decision-making.
It is also possible that intensified internal divisions undermine effective foreign policy
implementation over the long term. Such divisions could raise the stakes of political
competition to the point where previously respected norms regarding the political neutrality
of the armed forces and intelligence services are undermined. The extension of partisan
warfare to these organizations would encourage elected officials to staff them with political
loyalists rather than experienced professionals. The budgets and activities of the foreign
policy bureaucracy may also become mired in the same hyper-partisanship that currently
paralyzes debates over immigration and climate change in many western countries. This
degradation of apolitical professionalism may not occur over the course of a single
administration, but it could eventually cripple a nation’s ability to implement foreign policy.
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Only time will tell if this proves to be the case in countries such as the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Taiwan.

Analysis of Key Trends
This study found several interesting trends across the three cases that were examined.
Firstly, the question of whether election interference occurred was a source of controversy in
all three countries that were targeted. Moreover, the magnitude of this controversy seems to
directly correlate with the intensity of the interference. The United States and Taiwan both
experienced intense partisan debate over the extent to which election meddling occurred,
with the side alleged to have benefited from such interference being reluctant to acknowledge
that it happened even in the face of compelling evidence. The debate over Russian
interference in the “Brexit” referendum was notably less acrimonious but nevertheless
prompted accusations that Theresa May’s government failed to investigate Russian activities
from which it may have benefited (House of Commons). This lack of consensus on the basic
question of whether interference took place seems to have complicated targets’ efforts to
respond.
The highly controversial and political nature of responding to and attributing blame
for election interference gives rise to a vexing problem for democracies: the very occurrence
of foreign intervention almost always intensifies internal divisions. The more impactful and
well-known the interference, the more political polarization it will tend to create. Of course,
this is probably only true up to a certain point. Sufficiently brazen interference may convince
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politicians on both sides of the aisle that a robust response would be politically expedient.
Thus, a state using election interference to fuel a target’s internal divisions should calibrate
its activities to be noticeable but plausibly deniable, thus increasing the odds that any
response will become mired in acrimonious partisan politics. Some have alleged that Russia
acted in this manner in the 2016 election, deliberately allowing its attacks on state voting
systems to be discovered in order to sow discord (United States, 35). To combat such tactics,
states experiencing election interference may benefit from playing down allegations of
foreign meddling unless they can be quickly substantiated with irrefutable evidence.
It was also notable that foreign actors leveraged the internet and social media
platforms in order to spread disinformation in all three instances of election interference. This
trend was particularly notable in Taiwan and the United States, with significant portions of
both electorates being influenced by online “fake news”. There is also evidence to suggest
that Russian troll accounts attempted to influence the Brexit vote, although the extent of this
activity remains unclear. Intriguingly, both China and Russia appear to have employed social
media accounts purporting to belong to citizens of the countries they were targeting. These
accounts were then used to inject disinformation into public discourse. In many cases, this
disinformation was amplified by prominent political figures or news organizations, greatly
amplifying its effect. The central role of online disinformation in the election interference
campaigns examined in this study supports the claim that modern technology has
significantly increased the threat posed by election interference.
One surprising observation was that the country whose post-election policy changes
appeared most beneficial to foreign adversaries was the one that seemed to experienced the
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least election interference. The intensity of Russia’s intervention in the UK’s “Brexit”
referendum was coded as low (1 out of 6) and was the least severe instance of election
meddling observed in this study. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom’s foreign policy changes
following the referendum were quite favorable to Russia and were coded as 2 on a scale of -6
to 6. This suggests that states seeking to promote certain policy changes would do well to
keep their intervention discreet. Although brazen election interference campaigns do not
seem to inspire a broad backlash, it could be that retaliation from the faction harmed by such
behavior outweighs the support of the faction that benefited. This seems to have occurred in
Taiwan, where the DPP’s unfavorable reaction to Chinese interference was far more notable
than any concessions offered by the KMT.

Conclusions
This study contributes to a substantial body of scholarly literature pertaining to hybrid
warfare. Many of its findings appear to provide support for key concepts advanced by hybrid
warfare theory. Although scholars have proposed various definitions of hybrid warfare, they
largely agree on the importance of several key ideas. The implications of this study for some
of the most salient claims of hybrid warfare theory are discussed below.
Hybrid warfare theory posits that states may employ a mixture of conventional and
non-conventional tactics to aggressively pursue foreign policy goals while remaining below
the threshold of full-scale war. Thus, hybrid warfare is conceptualized as an alternative to
both excessively costly armed conflict and potentially ineffectual diplomacy. This study
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seems to support such a conceptualization. For instance, Chinese election interference in
Taiwan clearly appeared to be part of a larger campaign of hybrid warfare that involved
economic, diplomatic, and even military coercion. Although PRC leaders have expressed a
willingness to use military force, it seems that a hybrid strategy has allowed them to avoid
the high risks and negative diplomatic responses that war would entail. China’s behavior in
this case seems consistent with trends identified by Weichong Ong and Alessio Patalano,
both of whom argued that the PRC has been building up a range of hybrid capabilities to
enhance its power in the Asia-Pacific region. Overall, this study supports the claim that
hybrid warfare provides state actors with powerful alternatives to more conventional tactics.
Another idea advanced by the majority of hybrid warfare theorists is that states use
hybrid tactics in order to cultivate ambiguity. Some, including Jens Ohlin and Darin Johnson,
have even highlighted the ability of election interference to exploit ambiguous legal regimes
and thus complicate retaliation. This study appears to support the idea that ambiguity plays
an important role in hybrid warfare campaigns. In each case of election interference, the
difficulty of proving that foreign meddling took place seemed to encourage controversy over
how to respond. Although the United States and Taiwan were able to implement some
policies in response election to interference, these actions were controversial in both
countries and failed to deter further acts of hybrid warfare. Thus, the difficulty of proving
allegations of election interference seems to protect interveners from a robust response.
Many hybrid warfare theorists such as Vephkhvia Grigalashvili and Kęstutis
Kilinskas specifically highlight the importance of information warfare and cyber operations
in hybrid warfare. They argue that these tactics provide state actors with a low-risk, high-
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impact means of undermining an adversary. This study supports these claims. Information
warfare appeared to play a major role in every instance of election interference that was
investigated for this research. Moreover, the internet and social media platforms often
provided key conduits for foreign disinformation. Cyber operations also seem to have played
a major role in Russia’s election interference campaign against the United States. Taken
together, this information suggests that hybrid warfare has been rendered significantly more
effective by modern technology. This may help explain the seeming discrepancy between the
recent development of hybrid warfare theory and the long history of hybrid tactics in the
international arena.
This study participates in an ongoing scholarly debate regarding hybrid warfare
theory. Many hybrid warfare scholars such as Frank Hoffman suggest that hybrid conflicts
will involve the use of military force in some form. Others, including Patryk Babiracki and
Mitchell Ornstein, have contended that hybrid warfare theory can be applied to purely
political conflicts as well. Although Hoffman’s conception of hybrid warfare seems to be
more applicable in cases such as Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, the election
interference campaigns examined in this research suggest that hybrid warfare does not
require a military component. Russia’s election meddling in the United States provides the
best example of non-military hybrid aggression. It featured several key components of hybrid
warfare, including multimodality, ambiguity, and the collaboration of state actors and nonstate entities such as the Internet Research Agency. It was also distinguished from many
instances of more “traditional” election interference in that it was primarily motivated by a
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desire to weaken its target. Thus, hybrid warfare continues to be a meaningful concept even
in cases where military force is not used.
Moreover, conventional forces may not need to participate in combat in order to play
a role in hybrid warfare. For instance, China appears to have used its military to intimidate
the Taiwanese populace and support its portrayal of the DPP as a threat to the peace and
security of Taiwan. This deployment of military assets for the purposes of information
warfare underscores the flexibility and ever-evolving nature of hybrid warfare.

Potential Shortcomings of Hybrid Warfare Theory
Although hybrid warfare theory provides a powerful framework for understanding
modern geopolitical conflict and competition, this study hints at a few potential weaknesses
of the concept. Most importantly, it identifies a very wide range of behaviors that could be
considered acts of hybrid warfare. For instance, the relatively limited information warfare
that took place in the United Kingdom seems very different from the far-reaching campaign
of intimidation, economic pressure, and election interference deployed against Taiwan.
Critics such as Bettina Renz may argue that the concept of hybrid warfare losses its meaning
when it can be applied to so many different situations. Moreover, skeptics of hybrid warfare
are clearly right to caution that it is not a universally effective approach to foreign policy.
Though some instances of election interference do secure foreign policy concessions, others,
such as Chinese meddling in the Taiwanese local elections, fail to produce their intended
effects. Thus, it would be a mistake to assume that hybrid warfare is a panacea to the foreign
policy challenges facing state actors.
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However, this study generally supports the conclusion that hybrid warfare theory
provides useful insights. It is clear that many states employ coercive tactics, including
information warfare, election interference, and cyber attacks, that fall below the traditional
threshold of war. This behavior, which occurs outside the framework of both diplomacy and
conventional armed conflict, seems to be an increasingly common feature of modern
geopolitical competition. Though hybrid warfare theory is not perfect, it explains the
multimodal, ambiguous, and flexible nature of contemporary conflict better than any current
alternative.

Election Interference
Although this study is primarily grounded in hybrid warfare theory, it also engages
with the ongoing scholarly discussion of election interference. In their book Rules and Allies:
Foreign Election Interventions, Johannes Bubeck and Nikolay Marinov contend that there
are two broad types of election interference: candidate interventions that seek to aid specific
friendly politicians, and process interventions that aim to change the “rules” of the election
(Bubeck and Marinov, 45). They also argue that states seeking to impact the results of an
election may combine both of these tactics in order to maximize their influence. This study
supports the claim that there are different kinds of election interference that can be usefully
distinguished from each other. For instance, China’s attempts to promote the KMT in Taiwan
can be understood as classic candidate interventions. On the other hand, Russia’s election
interference in the United States seemed to combine a process intervention designed to sow
discord with a candidate intervention intended to promote Donald Trump. However, it is
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important to keep in mind that this instance of election meddling is distinct from those
studied by Bubeck and Marinov in that it was part of a larger campaign of hybrid warfare.
Overall, this study suggests the need to distinguish election interference campaigns intended
to promote a certain election outcome from those intended to sow discord.

Ideas for Future Research
There are several interesting possibilities for future research regarding election
interference. Although this study posited that an increase in internal divisions should lead to
more political controversy regarding foreign policy, it could be the case that intensified
political competition encourages actors to “outbid” each other by taking a hard line towards
potential adversaries. It is also possible that even leaders who benefited from foreign election
interference may seek to distance themselves from accusations of collusion by adopting an
assertive foreign policy towards the alleged intervener. Intensified political divisions and
louder complaints of election meddling may make such a tactic more attractive. Investigation
of these possibilities could help elucidate why election interference did not seem to cause
significant foreign policy concessions.
Additionally, future research could address the question of how hybrid warfare
campaigns change over time. Can hybrid warfare evolve into full scale military conflict? This
question seems particularly relevant in the case of Taiwan, which the PRC has vowed to seize
by force if necessary. It certainly seems possible that Chinese hybrid warfare against the
island could be recalibrated to weaken its resolve and willingness to fight in preparation for
an invasion. On the other hand, perhaps hybrid warfare could play a role in the continuation
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of “frozen conflicts” in which conventional hostilities have ceased. Investigation of these
questions could lead to the development of new models of international relations in which
binary distinctions between war and peace are replaced with a more nuanced “sliding scale”
of conflict intensity.
Future research could also investigate the long term implications of election
interference. Although this study found that foreign interventions increase the intensity of a
state’s internal divisions, it is still unknown how long these divisions persist. Perhaps
controversies inflamed by foreign actors fade away fairly quickly, but it is also possible that
they can become longstanding political schisms. Some interveners may attempt to promote
the latter outcome through continued activity in the aftermath of an election. Thus, a longerterm study of election interference campaigns may provide some useful insight into their role
as a tactic of hybrid warfare.
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